

## Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing

### **“Have Bush Administration Reconstruction and Anti-Corruption Failures Undermined the U.S. Mission in Iraq?”**

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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to this hearing. I am honored, and hope my participation will be useful to your work.

Along with this statement, I ask that the full text of the U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities Independent Task Force report, *In the Wake of War*, be entered into the record, and would like to note that the report is available at the Council on Foreign Relations’s website, [www.cfr.org](http://www.cfr.org). Some may say this report from July, 2005 is dated; I would argue it was prescient, and until the recommendations from the report are implemented, the United States will continue to face the issues of incompetence and negligence you are discussing today.

There are three points that I would make: first, the importance of recognizing stabilization and construction operations as critical national security priorities; second, the need for leadership within the U.S. government for building and coordinating U.S. post-conflict capabilities; third, the importance of fully funding our nation-building capacities.

I will start by emphasizing that stabilization and reconstruction operations are critical national security priorities. Dozens of countries are on the brink of collapse. These failing and failed states create vacuums of power that are often filled by terrorism, crime, civil conflict, corruption, and trafficking—all issues which affect the United States’s national security or our conscience. We must accept that these failed states are national security priorities and build our capabilities, both military and civilian, to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations. This requires acknowledging that war-fighting has two dimensions: winning wars and winning the peace. Iraq has clearly shown us what a lack of planning, leadership, accountability, and wisdom will cost our nation.

Leadership is, in fact, the most important factor. Improved responsiveness to post-conflict challenges cannot be accomplished without high-level attention and support in the U.S. executive and legislative branches. Throughout the 1990s, including my time in the Balkans, the U.S. government began to understand the complex nature of post-war operations and codified lessons learned, as well as improved planning for subsequent operations. In more recent times, this learning was disregarded, with devastating consequences in Iraq. A comprehensive and thoroughly vetted plan with sufficient forces allocated to public security, and provisions to provide basic public services and establish

the foundation for future political and economic development should have been part of the war plan.

Instead, the government's plan was ad hoc and incomplete without clear responsibilities established. It was without vision or wisdom. Importantly, the government failed to recognize that whether post-conflict efforts are done by government employees (civil or military) or contracted to private companies, all work must be part of a single, integrated plan for which responsibility and accountability are clear.

Only now are we beginning to return to the learning curve begun in the 1990s. And I should note that all of this is really more than "post-conflict reconstruction" – the leadership and capacities and resources of which I speak are equally applicable to "pre-conflict construction" – that is conflict prevention, an important element of any U.S. foreign policy approach.

My third point then is the importance of fully funding the budget requests related to these capabilities. If we are to get our house in order, authorizations and appropriations for defense, state, and foreign operations for FY 2008 and 2009 must reflect the right priorities. This Committee can and should have great influence on meeting our needs. Specifically, the FY 08 Emergency Supplemental should include no less than \$106 million dollars to fund the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and an active and standby response corps. Further, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act (H.R. 1084) that authorizes S/CRS and the civilian reserve corps has passed the House and is awaiting action in the Senate. I understand that the Senate version of the bill, S. 613, is being held up by one Senator. I urge you to take a leadership role and push the authorizing bill through the Senate. To criticize the Executive branch without taking appropriate legislative action does not serve the nation.

The final point I want to share with you is a personal note, I want to emphasize to this committee that the civilian implementation parts of stabilization missions are the most complex and the most difficult. As one of the few Americans who has been a leader in both military and civilian peacekeeping missions, I can tell you without reservation, that the civilian half needs far more study, leadership, resources, and prioritization. To bring the political, economic, social and security issues together in a comprehensive and coherent program in a foreign land under harsh and dangerous conditions is hard, very hard. Therefore, it is important for all members of this Committee to work collectively with their counterparts in the Senate and the House, especially the authorizations and appropriations committees, because the scope of these issues is much larger than the Defense or State Departments. Our government is not properly organized, resourced or led to meet the challenges we face.

Again, I thank the Committee for giving me an opportunity to speak with you today and, more particularly, for your interest in improving our nation's ability to address one of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century. I again refer members of the Committee and others to the *In the Wake of War* report, which assesses the progress of

the United States in developing a civilian and military capacity to meet the complex demands of stabilization and reconstruction operations and makes concrete recommendations for improving the U.S. government's ability to plan, coordinate, and execute these operations. I look forward to your questions, and I will be happy to provide my views on the specific reconstruction failures raised by the earlier speakers.