Congress has the Constitutional responsibility to perform oversight of the Executive Branch and matters of public interest. This report summarizes highlights from each week’s Senate oversight hearings.

 

Tuesday, February 6, 2007: Senate Budget Committee

“A Hearing on War Costs”

• The President’s “surge” plan will require far more troops than he has indicated. 
   
• The Bush Administration has consistently hidden the true costs of the war in Iraq. 
   
• Senator Conrad and witnesses declare that the Administration’s funding of the war through supplemental appropriations impedes oversight. 

 

Tuesday, February 6, 2007: Senate Armed Services Committee

“A Hearing on the President’s Budget Request”

• Secretary Gates reiterated his belief that the Iraqi forces are necessary for the success of the President’s troop surge plan. 
   
• However, Secretary Gates confirmed that Iraqi brigades are showing up at just a fraction of their strength. 
   
• Secretary Gates cannot provide an analysis of the level of reliability of Iraqi troops. 
   
• General Pace testified that the chain of command for U.S. and Iraqi forces under the Bush Administration’s surge plan is not ideal.

 

Tuesday, February 6, 2007: Senate Judiciary Committee

“Is the DOJ Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?”

• Despite the Attorney General’s assurance that he would never fire a U.S. Attorney for political reasons, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty revealed to the Committee that at least one U.S. Attorney was fired for no other reason than to make room for a less qualified Republican political operative. 
   
• The Bush Administration’s firing practices are inconsistent with previous Administrations. 
   
• Democratic and Republican Senators and witnesses were deeply troubled by the Administration’s circumvention of the traditional appointment process.
   

Tuesday, February 6, 2007: Senate Environment and Public Works Committee

“Oversight of Recent Environmental Protection Agency Decisions”

• EPA has proposed weakening its rules for toxic air pollution, limiting the public’s knowledge of toxic releases and potentially leading to increased pollution.
   
• EPA has proposed eliminating the current air quality standard for lead, which is a serious and well-documented health hazard.
   
• EPA’s new approach to setting air quality standards injects politics into the process and will likely lead to weaker air standards. 

 

Wednesday, February 7, 2007: Senate Commerce Committee

“Climate Change Research and Scientific Inquiry”

• Current and former Bush Administration officials acknowledged that climate change is real and that human actions are contributing to it. 
   
• The Bush Administration’s former Director of the Climate Change Science Program admitted he knew of political suppression of climate science during his tenure between April 2002 and March 2006. 
   
• The Administration pledged that it is working to ensure government scientists will not be censored in the future. 

 

Thursday, February 8, 2007: Senate Foreign Relations Committee

“The President’s Foreign Affairs Budget”

• Secretary Rice denies difficulties in staffing diplomatic posts in Iraq. 
   
• Committee Republicans criticize lack of language capacity in the State Department. 
   
• Senators question the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to talk with Syria.
   

Friday, February 9, 2007: Senate Armed Services Committee

“A Briefing on the Department of Defense Inspector General’s Report on the Activities of the Office of Special Plans Prior to the War in Iraq”

• Senator Levin believes that the Office of Special Plans (OSP) provided inaccurate information that shaped the views of senior Administration officials. 
   
• OSP presented its reports as intelligence product, without reflecting disagreements within the intelligence community, which the Inspector General found to be inappropriate. 
   
• OSP improperly changed its briefing slides for different audiences, showing different information to the White House than to the intelligence community.

 

The President’s “surge” plan will require far more troops than he has indicated.

Dr. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office: Thus far, DoD has identified only combat units for deployment. However, U.S. military operations also require substantial support forces, including personnel to staff headquarters, serve as military police, and provide communications, contracting, engineering, intelligence, medical, and other services…CBO expects that, even if the additional brigades required fewer support units than historical practice suggests, those units would still represent a significant additional number of military personnel.
 

The Bush Administration has consistently hidden the true costs of the war in Iraq.

SEN. CONRAD: Let me just indicate that we have a pattern here of the administration hiding the ball from the Congress and the American people on the cost of this war. It started at the beginning and it has continued right through. Until last year, they told us in every one of their budget submissions there was not going to be any cost to the war. Last year, they told us it was going to cost us $50 billion and we’re at $163 billion and counting. Now you tell us, Dr. Gilmore, that the so-called“surge,” or the escalation, which the administration has told us is going to cost $5.6 billion, you have told us that if it lasts a year, the more likely cost is $20 to $27 billion. Have I got that right? Is your estimate that a year-long additional deployment as called for in the President’s plan would be in the range of $20 to $27 billion? 

Dr. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office: If the increase were extended to 12 months, including three-month build-up and three-month ramp-down, the total cost through 2009 that we estimate would be $20 to $27 billion. Now, our understanding of what the President’s plan calls for at this point, which is a build-up hitting about 20 brigades in theater in May extending through August and then a ramp-down. The total cost through 2009 would be $9 to $13 billion, and in 2007 would be $7 to $9 billion, depending on the level of support forces…As far as I understand what the administration is saying at this point, they would say there would be 160 to 166,000 troops in theater in May, and that is just absolutely inconsistent with what we know of Army planning and what the administration has executed in the past, and what the administration announced last November in terms of the needed support package for the forces that are going to be part of the rotation. 

SEN. CONRAD: Let me just say in looking at this, it seems to me that the administration’s claim is just not credible. It is not credible based on what the history has been, not only in this conflict, but other conflicts. It is not credible with respect to what we have seen in Iraq.

 

Senator Conrad says that war costs exceed those of Vietnam.

SEN. CONRAD: Including the requests in the President’s budget released yesterday, the administration has now asked for a total of over $520 billion in emergency funding – on top of the regular defense budget. That is more than 10 times the administration’s original war cost estimate. To put this cost in perspective, the Iraq war is now approaching the cost of the Vietnam War. In 12 years of major involvement in Vietnam, we spent $650 billion in today’s dollars. Less than four years after the invasion of Iraq, we are now considering a request that will bring the total cost of the Iraq war to more than $500 billion. And that is without including the $50 billion placeholder the President included in his budget for war costs in 2009. If we add Iraq and Afghanistan costs together, we are already well above the cost of the Vietnam War.

 

Senator Conrad asserts that the focus on Iraq has come at the expense of Afghanistan.

SEN. CONRAD: Unfortunately, Iraq has diverted resources from our effort in Afghanistan…The budget also reflects those wrong priorities. Between what we have spent and what the administration has requested, Iraq has received three dollars for every dollar in Afghanistan. That is despite the fact that it was Osama bin Laden, based in Afghanistan, who attacked the United States and not Iraq led by Saddam Hussein.

 

Senator Conrad and witnesses declare that the Administration’s funding of the war through supplemental appropriations impedes oversight.

SEN. CONRAD: The administration has been financing this war, not through the regular budget process, but as you know through a series of supplemental appropriations bills. We very much believe that these war costs ought to be considered in the regular budget process so they get the oversight that they deserve. To do the war funding the way the administration has been doing it avoids accountability and oversight. More spending, over $10 billion a month, we think it’s critically important that Congress conduct its oversight responsibility. 

Dr. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office: DoD’s supplemental budget requests often do not provide enough detail to determine how the department develops its budget requests. The amount of justification material that DoD provides in its regular budget for activities besides the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism and the documentation that it submits for war-related operations differ substantially. The $440 billion requested by DoD for its regular activities in fiscal year 2007 was supported by very detailed justification documents. By contrast, DoD’s funding requests related to the war have been accompanied by relatively little backup material. 

DR. GORDON ADAMS, FELLOW, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS: The continuing use of emergency supplementals is not typical in wartime…In the Global War or Terror case, however, the Defense Department has, in effect, been running two parallel budget processes, one for the GWOT and the other for the regular defense budget. Continuing this practice over eight budgets has had a debilitating effect on the integrity of the defense planning and budget process in the Department of Defense…Given the urgent timing for supplementals and the reality that they receive less scrutiny, there has been a tendency in the Department to seek, through emergency supplemental funding, programs that do not meet the reasonable test for a war-related emergency: that the requested funds meet urgent requirements that could not be anticipated in the normal budget cycle. 

Secretary Gates reiterated his belief that the Iraqi forces are necessary for the success of the President’s troop surge plan.

GATES: I've testified several times that I believe the performance of the Iraqis is absolutely critical to the success of this operation. 

However, Secretary Gates confirmed that Iraqi brigades are showing up at just a fraction of their strength.

SEN. McCAIN: Recent reports, Secretary Gates, indicate that Iraqi army units are showing up in Baghdad significantly under-strength. Is that accurate? And, if so, is it of concern to you? 

GATES: I received a report at the end of the last week that one of the Iraqi brigades had showed up at 55 percent strength. And I told reporters at a press roundtable at the Pentagon that that wasn't good enough. I learned in a report from General Casey yesterday that, in fact, they had showed up at 60 percent and that 25 percent were on leave, either to take their pay back home or to protect their home base. So he felt that the level of turnout for the brigade, in his opinion -- and I don't think I'm misquoting him -- was better than expected. 

Secretary Gates cannot provide an analysis of the level of reliability of Iraqi troops.

SEN. BILL NELSON: The reason I'm asking this, this senior military official that testified in this unclassified material is saying of those that are showing up in Baghdad that he expects 80 percent of them to be reliable. Therefore, 20 percent is going to be unreliable. And if that's true -- and I don't know what's true; I'm the one that keeps asking the questions about reliability --if the whole situation of the president's plan is predicated on the reliability of the Iraqi troops; that when we go in to clear before we hold that it's more Iraqi troops than American troops, they've got to be reliable. And I'm trying to get my hands around are they reliable or not. 

GATES: Senator, I think that's the question we all have. And I think -- we've talked here a lot about we're going to have to see how it actually plays out on the ground. People have their theories about how this is going to work and how many are reliable and this, that and the other thing. And we have a mutual interest in an honest evaluation on how these guys are doing, because it's our kids that are out there at risk. I probably shouldn't say “kids,” but it's our men and women out there... 

SEN. BILL NELSON: Mr. Chairman, I'll just say, in conclusion, that what bothers me is if the president's plan -- and Senator Warner is nodding his head, because we've talked about this -- if the president's plan is predicated on the reliability of the troops -- of the Iraqi troops, and yet no one has a handle until we see them in action as to whether or not they're reliable, that doesn't sound to me to be the good way to do a plan.
 

General Pace testified that the chain of command for U.S. and Iraqi forces under the Bush Administration’s surge plan is not ideal.

SEN. WARNER: But when they take charge, we've got a dual command there, do we not? 

PACE: We have a single chain of command for U.S. troops. 

SEN. WARNER: For U.S. troops. 

PACE: There's a single chain of command for Iraq troops. And there's a mechanism between the commanders to work collaboratively together, pared down to the battalion -- and brigade-level, to be able to provide support, U.S. supporting Iraqi troops. 

SEN. WARNER: But as you know, some of us are concerned as to how that might work --when we get down to the company-level, whether or not two company commanders or two platoon commanders, one Iraqi, one American, get into a quarrel, what we do. Now I understand you're going to look at that very carefully and you have a high degree of confidence that this system can work, is that it? 

PACE: Sir, I have a high degree of confidence that the U.S. officers in the chain of command understand from whom they take their orders and what they're supposed to do. 

SEN. WARNER: But if that's in conflict with what the Iraqis want to do, who resolves the conflict? 

PACE: Sir, there's a mechanism for that. If it's immediately on the ground and there's a disagreement, then the U.S. commander will simply just not do whatever it is that the Iraqi commander's asked him to do. 

SEN. WARNER: Well, I hope it works. I repeat that: I hope it works. 

PACE: It is not as clean as we would like, sir. 

SEN. WARNER: No, it's not.

 

General Pace confirmed that there will be a shortage of Humvees for our troops in Iraq for the next several months.

SEN. LEVIN: Can you give us assurance that troops arriving in the theater are going to be fully equipped and trained before they enter combat in Iraq? 

PACE: Sir, the short answer to your question is yes, sir. I had a discussion as recently as yesterday with both General Conway, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and General Schoomaker and General Cody, the chief of staff and vice chief of the Army. They are looking at the deployment plan to get the additional troops to Iraq. The timeline that our troops are on will allow us to fully man, train and equip the units before they deploy to Iraq. There's one area that is not going to be 100 percent equipment, and that has to do with the up-armored Humvees and some of the armored trucks. We have about 41,000-plus armored vehicles in-theater. There is a small delta that that number will not be able to cover all of the troops that are deploying. But the mandate from General Casey is and will remain that no one will leave operating bases unless they are in properly up-armored Humvees. So we do have a delta there. That will be closed by July of this year. But that's the only place where the troops will not have the equipment before they deploy.

 

Secretary Gates testified that the al-Maliki government did not initially buy in to the troop surge plan.

GATES: It is clear that Prime Minister Maliki intends to fulfill the commitments that he's made. It's clear he wants Iraq to be in charge of this operation. 

BEN NELSON: …Is it really that clear? Because he and some of his members of his government have raised questions about whether more U.S. troops were desirable and whether it was going to be an Iraqi military operation in Baghdad. 

GATES: No, that's absolutely right. And I think that his original hope had been that this would be an entirely Iraqi operation. And it was when his military people began talking with our military people that they in essence persuaded him that the Iraqis perhaps weren't ready to do it all by themselves, just like we had to provide air support in this one other attack that just happened last week. And so he has, I think grudgingly, accepted having U.S. support where he wanted to do it all all by themselves. We don't want them to fail. So I think that they have the desire and the intent to make this work. I think what remains to be seen is whether they have the capacity to do it. And if they can't make it work -- we're planning on them fulfilling their commitments, and if they can't, then, as I have said, I think we have to revisit our strategy.

The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing to investigate the controversial and suspicious firing of several well-qualified and well-respected US Attorneys, possibly for political reasons.

SEN. SCHUMER: I have observed, with increasing alarm, how politicized the Department of Justice has become. I have watched with growing worry as the department has increasingly based hiring on political affiliation, ignored the recommendations of career attorneys, focused on the promotion of political agendas and failed to retain legions of talented career attorneys. And, now, it appears even the hiring and firing of our top federal prosecutors has become infused and corrupted with political, rather than prudent, considerations. Or, at least, there is a very strong appearance that this is so…Several U.S. Attorneys were apparently fired with no real explanation. Several were seemingly removed merely to make way for political up and comers. One was fired in the midst of a successful and continuing investigation of lawmakers. Another was replaced with a pure partisan of limited prosecutorial experience, without Senate confirmation…At a Judiciary Committee hearing last month, [the Attorney General] testified that, quote, "I would never, ever make a change in a U.S. attorney position for political reasons," unquote. And yet the recent purge of top federal prosecutors reeks of politics. An honest look at the record reveals something is rotten in Denmark. 

Despite the Attorney General’s assurance that he would never fire a U.S. Attorney for political reasons, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty revealed to the Committee that at least one U.S. Attorney was fired for no other reason than to make room for a less qualified Republican political operative.

SEN. SCHUMER: I want to go back to Bud Cummins. First, Bud Cummins has said that he was told he had done nothing wrong and he was simply being asked to resign to let someone else have the job. Does he have it right? 

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL McNULTY: I'll accept that as being accurate, as best I know the facts. 

SEN. SCHUMER: So, in other words, Bud Cummins was fired for no reason. There was no cause. 

McNULTY: No cause [was] provided in his case, as I'm aware of it. 

SEN. SCHUMER: None at all. And was there anything materially negative in his evaluations, in his EARS reports or anything like that? From the reports that everyone has received, he had done an outstanding job and had gotten good evaluations. Do you believe that to be true? 

McNULTY: I don't know of anything that's negative, and I haven't seen his reports, or probably only one that was done during his tenure, but I haven't seen it. But I'm not aware of anything. 

SEN. SCHUMER: So here we have the Attorney General adamant. Here's his quote, "We would never, ever make a change in the U.S. attorney position for political reasons." Then, for the first time, we learn [from you] that Bud Cummins was asked to leave for no reason and we're putting in someone who has all kinds of political connections, not disqualifiers, obviously, certainly not legally…te question is, do you believe that firing a well-performing U.S. attorney to make way for a political operative is not a political reason? 

McNULTY: Yes, I believe it is not a political reason. 

SEN. SCHUMER: OK, could you try to explain yourself there? 

McNULTY: I'll do my best. I think that the fact that he had political activities in his background does not speak to the question of his qualifications for being a United States attorney in that district. I think an honest look at his resume shows that while it may not be the thickest when it comes to prosecution experience. It's not insignificant, either. He had been assistant United States attorney in that district, who set up their Project Safe Neighborhoods Program. 

SEN. SCHUMER: For how long had he been there? 

McNULTY: I think that was about a year or so. 

SEN. SCHUMER: I think it was less than that, a little less than that. 

McNULTY: But he did a number of gun cases in that period of time. He's also done a lot of trials as a JAG attorney. He'd gone and served his country over in Iraq. He came back from Iraq and he was looking for a new opportunity…

 SEN. SCHUMER: So you can say to me that you -- you put in your testimony you want somebody who's the best person possible. Do you think Mr. Griffin is the best person possible? I can't even see how Mr. Griffin would be better qualified in any way than Bud Cummins, who had done a good job, who was well respected, who had now had years of experience. There's somebody who served a limited number of months on a particular kind of case and had all kinds of other connections. It sure doesn't pass the smell test… 

McNULTY: I didn't say best person possible…I said well qualified, and those words were purposely chosen to say that he met the standards that are sufficient to take a job like that… 

SEN. SCHUMER: I don't want to pick here, with my friend Paul McNulty, quote, from your testimony, "For these reasons, the department is committed to having the best person possible discharging the responsibilities of that office at all times, in every district." I find it hard to believe that Tim Griffin was the best person possible. I find it hard to believe that anyone who did an independent evaluation in the Justice Department thought that Tim Griffin was a superior choice to Bud Cummins.

 

Former U.S. Attorney’s shared the problems created when U.S. Attorneys are fired at whim or for political reasons.

MARY JOWHITE (DEBEVOISe & PLIMPTON; FORMER U.S. ATTORNEY IN NEW YORK): In my view, the Department of Justice should guard against acting in ways that may be perceived to diminish the importance of the office of United States attorney or of its independence…[C]hanging a United States attorney invariably causes disruption and often loss of traction in cases and investigations. This is especially so in sensitive or controversial cases, where the leadership and independence of the U.S. Attorney are often crucial to the successful pursuit of such matters, particularly in the face of criticism or political backlash. Replacing a U.S. attorney can, of course, be necessary, or part of the normal and expected process that accompanies a change of the political guard. But I do not believe that such changes should, as a matter of sound policy, be undertaken lightly or without significant cause. If U.S. Attorneys are replaced during an administration without apparent good cause, the wrong message can be sent to other U.S. Attorneys. We want our U.S. Attorneys to be strong and independent in carrying out their jobs.

 

The Bush Administration’s firing practices are inconsistent with previous Administrations.

Laurie Levinson, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School: Although there has always been a political component to the selection of United States attorneys, what is happening now is categorically different. Traditionally, we saw change over when there was a new administration. Thus, when President Clinton came in, he had every right and did ask for those resignations. But we have never seen what we're seeing today, which is in quick succession seven U.S. attorneys who have excellent credentials, successful records and outstanding reputations being dismissed mid-term. And we've never seen their interim replacements, at least some of them, coming in with the lack of experience and qualification they have and being put in on an interim basis indefinitely without the prior process that we had for evaluation. We all recognize that federal prosecutors serve at the pleasure of the president and the Department of Justice controls many of the policies and the purse strings. But it has been a strong tradition of local autonomy and accountability and continuity that has made these district U.S. attorneys successful, not the arbitrary dismissals in order to give others a fresh start.

 

Democratic and Republican Senators and witnesses were deeply troubled by the Administration’s circumvention of the traditional appointment process.

SEN. SCHUMER: These firings, coincidentally, followed a legal change slipped into the PATRIOT Act in the dead of night, which for the first time in our history gave the Attorney General the power to make indefinite interim appointments and to bypass the Senate altogether. 

SEN. SPECTER: Prior to the PATRIOT Act, U.S. Attorneys were replaced by the Attorney General for 120 days, and then appointments by the court, or the first assistant succeeded to the position of U.S. Attorney…[But] the PATRIOT Act gave broader powers to the Attorney General to appoint replacement U.S. attorneys…I do agree that we ought to change it back to where it was before. 

LEVINSON: I think that the prior system, the one that Senators Specter and Feinstein are talking about returning to, has strong benefits in comparison to the [Administration’s] approach. Under [the former] approach, the Attorney General makes the initial appointment. It gives plenty of time to the department to come up with a nominee and present that nominee [to the Senate], and then, if that is not able to happen in a timely fashion, the chief judge starts making appointments…[C]ompare [that] to the current system under the PATRIOT Act, where only the Attorney General is involved in the process and those interim appointments can be forever, and there may be no or little oversight by the Senate, because there is not the traditional confirmation process. 

WHITE: [I]n his well-known address to the United States Attorneys in 1940, then-Attorney General Robert H. Jackson . . . said the prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. Because of this immense power, the post of United States Attorney, from the very beginning, has been safeguarded by presidential appointments requiring confirmation of the Senate of the United States.

Senator Boxer held an oversight hearing on six EPA proposals from late 2006 to roll back health protections and reduce public information about pollution.

SEN. BOXER: These EPA rollbacks have common themes: they benefit polluters’ bottom line, and they hurt our communities by allowing more pollution and reducing the information about pollution available to the public. Today is the first in a series of hearings. EPA has gone too long without meaningful oversight. I want to send a clear signal to EPA and to this Administration. We are watching. The American public is watching. And no longer will EPA rollbacks quietly escape scrutiny.” 

GAO found that EPA’s actions could reduce the availability of toxic release information to the public.

John Stephenson (Director for Natural Resources and the Environment, GAO): We believe that the TRI reporting changes will likely have a significant impact on information available to the public about dozens of toxic chemicals from thousands of facilities in states and communities across the country…In addition, preliminary results from our survey of state TRI coordinators indicate that many believe the changes will negatively affect information available to the public and efforts to protect the environment. 
 

Witnesses said that air quality standards for lead should be strengthened to reflect more complete scientific information, not eliminated, as EPA is considering.

John Balmes, M.D. (American Lung Association): While no one disputes that the reduction of lead air pollution is one of the most significant accomplishments of the Clean Air Act, we do not see the scientific basis for eliminating lead as a criteria pollutant. It would be impossible to assess the impact of lead air pollution on health if lead were eliminated as a criteria pollutant with the attendant reduction in the already inadequate ambient air lead monitoring and the elimination of the periodic review of the scientific research on the health effects of lead air pollution required by the Clean Air Act. 

Gina Solomon, M.D., M.P.H. (Natural Resources Defense Council): The news that EPA is considering revocation of the air quality standard for lead was a shock to scientists, children’s health advocates, and communities across the country. Lead is one of the best-studied poisons in the world today, and it has been clearly shown to impair children’s health in thousands of major scientific studies. Lead affects the brain by impairing neurological development, blunting IQ, and shortening children’s attention span. It also affects the kidneys and the cardiovascular system. More recent studies have linked lead exposure to diseases as diverse as osteoporosis, cataracts, and cognitive decline in the elderly. As a clinician who has treated lead poisoned children and adults, I can tell you that this toxic substance has devastating effects on people’s lives. 

In fact, lead remains very much a problem today. An estimated 310,000 children aged 1-5 in the U.S. remain at risk from harmful blood lead levels according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Furthermore, in a recent review, CDC concluded that ‘no level of lead in a child’s blood can be specified as safe’,and that health effects have been demonstrated below the current blood lead threshold. Therefore EPA should be revising the 1978 standard to bring it into line with the current science, which would mean a substantial reduction of the standard.

 

Doctors testified that EPA’s new process for setting air quality standards reduces the role of scientists, which will weaken health standards.

BALMES: I am here to express my alarm that the careful process for establishing and reviewing National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) that EPA has developed to implement the Clean Air Act is being altered by this administration in ways that will weaken its effectiveness in the future. This process has proven to be enormously successful over the last three decades at achieving the goal of protecting the public health by improving our nation’s air quality. In my view, the changes adopted under the guise of ‘streamlining’ the NAAQS review process will weaken both the health protection the standards were intended to provide and diminish the scientific basis on which the standards were intended to rely. 

SOLOMON: This so-called ‘efficient process’ is actually a rough-shod short cut through the science. The new process will significantly reduce public comment, scientific review, and EPA scientific staff input. Instead, the new process is tailor-made to allow political appointees at EPA to have maximum flexibility and discretion in the standard-setting process. 

Senator Inouye noted the need for federal scientists to work unconstrained by political ideology as the government creates a comprehensive climate policy.

SEN. INOUYE: Over the course of this Congress, the Commerce Committee will pursue legislation to strengthen the federal climate research program. However, before we can even begin debate on climate change, we much investigate the numerous allegations that our federal scientists are being constrained from conveying their research findings and conclusions. 

Such allegations are serious. We in Congress as well as decision makers within the regulatory agencies must examine and weigh the scientific evidence to guide changes in policies, laws, and regulations. To deny federal scientists the right to speak, to change the findings of their work, or to deny the release of their work, basically creating an atmosphere of intimidation and fear, is a great disservice to the public.

 

A climate scientist testified about instances of political interference with his contact with the media.

THOMAS KNUTSON (RESEARCH METEREOLOGIST, NOAA): There have been instances where my ability to communicate with the national media has been hindered or interfered with… NOAA’s media policy issued in June 2004 requires prior notification of Public Affairs before media interviews involving policy relevant research such as mine. This led to a number of missed opportunities for interviews, at times simply due to the additional hurdle and complexity of getting in touch or coordinating with Public Affairs people in Washington (for example evenings and weekends). The impression I had (along with others at GFDL) is that at times NOAA Public Affairs was becoming more of an obstruction than a promoter of interaction between GFDL scientists and the media. Examples of such interference that either others or I experienced included: cancelled press releases, requests for interviews that were never responded to (“i.e., pocket vetoes”), and being given guidelines for steering certain interview questions in directions that were not based on science considerations. 

Returning from vacation, I listened over the weekend to a voicemail from NOAA Public Affairs inquiring about whether I would be interested in appearing on a television talk show involving Ron Reagan, Jr., to discuss hurricanes and global warming. A second voice mail came from a “booker” for the show. As it was the weekend, I responded to the booker’s cell number and agreed to make myself available for taping on Monday, providing the appearance was approved by Public Affairs. Arriving at my office on Monday morning, I listened to a new voicemail from Public Affairs advising me something to the effect of: “Tom, sorry for the confusion…the White House said no...”

 

The Administration’s former chief of climate science admitted knowledge of scientists being discouraged from talking to the media during his time at NOAA.

KERRY: Are there instances where scientific findings have been prevented from being spoken to the media by NOAA scientists? 

JAMES MAHONEY (ENVIROMENTAL CONSULTANT): What I think has occurred in some cases is in the process of interacting with the public affairs representatives and NOAA in particular, there has been a perception developed that some of the scientists were in some cases discouraged from carrying out interviews with the media. Interviews that might have been set up were denied by the public affairs office representatives and the like. I certainly saw instances of that during my time at NOAA.

 

The Administration is now claiming it has always believed human activities are causing global climate change.

BILL BRENNAN (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, NOAA): The Administration has always been clear that climate change is a serious problem, the Earth is warming and humans are the leading cause.

 

In response to pressure from Congress, scientists, and media reports, the Administration said it was working to make sure government scientists will not face future censorship.

BILL BRENNAN: Regarding scientific communications and openness, the Administration takes the concerns of its scientists very seriously, and each Department and Agency is reviewing (and modifying if necessary) its policies to ensure government scientists do not face censorship on any scientific matter, including climate change issues. 

Secretary Rice denies difficulties in staffing diplomatic posts in Iraq.

SEN. LUGAR: Let me just ask this question: New York Times this morning said the State Department sources are quoted as saying that only junior-level officers are signing up for Iraq. What is your view on that situation? 

SECRETARY RICE: Well, Senator, the numbers are as follows. We have 57 generalist Foreign Service officers. That's the, sort of, general Foreign Service category. Sixteen are entry-level officers, 6 are senior Foreign Service, and the remaining 35 are mid-level. So it's just not correct. And that, by the way, is about the average distribution in other large posts. So we've worked very hard to recruit people who have appropriate experience for the jobs that they are taking on. Languages are a big problem, but beyond that, we do recruit people who have appropriate experience. 

SEN. BIDEN: Initially, as I understood, speaking to State Department personnel on site admissions, was that diverting to a hot spot like Iraq, volunteering, was not viewed as a plus in the career path. Is it clear that those who are willing to do that now get the little extra star next to their name, that it actually is an asset in their career path? And could you explain that very briefly? 

SECRETARY RICE: Without trying to change the promotion system or to do something to really throw it completely off track, yes, though, we have made clear that we expect service in these unaccompanied posts to be considered a plus. And it's not just Baghdad and Kabul. It's also places like Islamabad.

 

Committee Republicans criticize lack of language capacity in the State Department.

SEN. LUGAR: State Department positions in key countries are still going unfilled, or are being filled by junior officers without adequate language skills. Our public diplomacy in particular is encumbered by a lack of experience and resources. We cannot afford second-tier embassies when we are in the midst of a worldwide campaign against terror. 

.. 

SEN. COLEMAN: You talked about language. And it's interesting. It shifts. Russian was important when you were a student; Arabic today. When I was in Dubai, it was fascinating, talking to the embassy folks, that Farsi is becoming of greater importance. So I would hope we continue to put efforts into that…this language deficiency that we have…really does hamper our efforts to greater understand the challenges and the opportunities in the Middle East and other places. 

SECRETARY RICE: If I could just mention, we do have good language speakers in Baghdad. I don't want to leave that impression. If 2-2 is the grading for basic proficiency speaking and reading but 3-3 is professional proficiency, we have eight people in Baghdad who have the basic skills; 11 in the PRTs with the basic skills; four with 3-3 or above, which is considered professional; and five with 3-3 and above. But we've had to work awfully hard to get them there. And I still need language speakers of Arabic in Beirut and in Cairo and around the world.

 

Senators question the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to talk with Syria.

SEN. DODD: But given the fact that Syria can play such an important role here, would you mind explaining why there's still a reluctance to engage Syria, at least on these issues where they've offered to be of help? 

SEN. CASEY: Former Secretary Baker was here before this committee recently. He and Congressman Hamilton spoke directly about the Iraq Study Group recommendations. But one part of his testimony I think was particularly striking, with regard to Syria and the role that he believed that Syria can play in the Middle East generally, but in particular with regard to Iraq. 

SECRETARY RICE: We have diplomatic relations with Syria. I need to keep reminding people, we don't have diplomatic relations with Iran, of course, going back 27 years, but with Syria, we do. And if there were any evidence, any hint that Syria was changing its course -- and it should just change its course -- we don't have an ideological problem with talking to Syria. We've talked with them in this administration. We could do it again. But the problem is, they are not engaging in constructive behavior, and we don't see how that would change, currently, by talking to them.

 

Secretary Rice doesn’t believe that Iran offered to recognize Israel in 2003.

SEN. DODD: There have been some reports that in 2003 the Iranian government proposed direct talks with the United States, and on the table was recognition of the state of Israel. I know you were raised -- this issue was raised in the last day or so. Would you be willing to share, obviously under closed-door circumstances, with members of the committee, the cable traffic on this issue that was raised? 

SECRETARY RICE: I'll just tell you, Senator, I don't personally remember reading this fax that has been talked about. I can't say categorically that I didn't, but I don't remember reading it. I would have to say, I think if it had offered to recognize Israel -- the Iranian government had said, "We will recognize Israel," I would have probably taken note of that.

 

While the American taxpayer bears the burden, Iraqis mismanage funds.

SEN. KERRY: You've asked for an additional $2 billion for Iraq. According to the GAO study that was presented to us a few months ago, in Iraq itself, Iraq has only spend 8 percent of the annual capital goods budget and 14 percent of its annual capital projects budget. The report found that the Ministry of Oil had expended only $4 million of a $3.5 billion capital budget. Now, if the Iraqis aren't spending the money that they have, that's being banked here, why should the American taxpayer lay out an additional $2 billion, particularly knowing that the last money spent went to -- in many cases -- swimming pools, VIP trailers, cars that aren't accounted for, just -- it's unaccounted…why, in view of the reluctance of Iraqis to spend the money themselves, should the American taxpayer? 

SECRETARY RICE: The Iraqis have allocated $10 billion that they now intend to spend on infrastructure, capital improvements, job creation, a number of other activities…But, Senator, if the underlying tone of the question here is the Iraqis ought to start to spend their own money, I agree completely, and we're telling them exactly that. 

SEN. WEBB: To follow on what some other people were asking you, I met with the special inspector general yesterday. He indicated that there's $12 billion in unspent Iraqi government funds…And the difficulty that I'm having with that is, given the infrastructure problems here in the United States and the lamentable state of repair in post-Katrina along New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, and the fact that this money hasn't been spent and we have a $2 billion request, again, to come from the American taxpayers, how do you justify this? 

SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, Senator, let me agree with the underlying theme, which is the Iraqis ought to be spending their own money. We agree. And we have pressed them on this matter…We've been pressing them, for instance, to do more on operation and maintenance of projects that we actually funded and have completed…The monies that we are requesting are really not traditional reconstruction funding. These really relate much more to activities that would be carried on in the more decentralized PRT structures; ministry support to help them become more capable of putting in systems that allow them to take resources from Baghdad and actually spend them in the provinces; community support efforts that go alongside our counterinsurgency efforts with the military. That's really much more the character of this $2 billion.

  

Senator Levin believes that the Office of Special Plans (OSP) provided inaccurate information that shaped the views of senior Administration officials.

SEN. LEVIN: These findings of the inspector general reinforce a conclusion that I reached in my report more than two years ago: that the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy generated its own intelligence analysis inconsistent with the views of the intelligence community in order to support the policy goals of the administration. 

… 

Senior administration officials used the twisted intelligence produced by the Feith office in making the case for the Iraq war. As I concluded in my October 2004 report, quote, "Misleading or inaccurate statements about the Iraq-Al Qaida relationship made by senior administration officials, were not supported by the intelligence community analyses, but more closely reflected the Feith policy office views.” 
 

OSP presented its reports as intelligence product, without reflecting disagreements within the intelligence community, which the Inspector General found to be inappropriate.

THOMAS GIMBLE, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: We found that the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on Iraq and Al Qaida relations which included conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the intelligence community and these were presented to senior decision-makers. 

While such actions are not illegal or unauthorized, the actions, in our opinion, were inappropriate, given that all the products did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the intel community, and in some cases were shown as intel products. 

The condition occurred because the role of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Policy was expanded from the mission of doing defense policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative intelligence. As a result, the office did not provide the most accurate analysis of intelligence to the senior decision-makers.

 

OSP improperly changed its briefing slides for different audiences, showing different information to the White House than to the intelligence community.

SEN. REED: Now, in the series of briefings that Mr. Feith gave, did he provide identical information at every briefing? 

GIMBLE: There were some variations of the briefing. 

SEN. REED: And what are the most significant variations? 

GIMBLE: Let me get that -- capture this correctly, because I want... 

SEN. REED: Can you please bring the microphone?

GIMBLE: Let me get this. I need to make sure what's not classified in this. Senator, this is marked secret. I mean, I understand the...(CROSSTALK) 

SEN. REED: I don't want to go into -- I don't want to go into secret matters here because that's inappropriate. But in a general sense, he changed the briefing for his audience. Is that correct? 

GIMBLE: Sorry? 

SEN. REED: He changed the briefing for his audience? 

GIMBLE: There were adjustments made depending on the audience. 

…. 

GIMBLE: Sir, there's two issues here. The chart -- the briefing got changed three times. For each of the three, there was differences in that, OK? 

… 

SEN. LEVIN: In addition, we will be talking to witnesses who presented that slide presentation to the Vice President's Office and to the National Security Council. So if you would supply us with the names of the people from the Feith office that did make this presentation, we will be interviewing those folks. We will also seek interviews with Mr. Hadley, Mr. Libby, and see whether or not they will be willing to meet with us.