When President Obama came to office, we did not have the resources or strategy in place to advance critical U.S. national security goals in Pakistan – a country central to confronting the threat of the Taliban and al Qaeda, preventing nuclear terrorism, and promoting stability in a strategically vital region of the world. As the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in April of 2008, the United States had “no comprehensive plan” in place “to destroy the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA region.” Years of neglect and short-sighted policies allowed al Qaeda and affiliated terrorists to secure new safe havens in the tribal regions and, in the words of our intelligence community, left Pakistan“on the edge,” and without the capacity to confront an intensifying terrorist threat inside its borders. In March of 2008, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden warned that the terrorists operating along border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan represented a “clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan and to the West in general, and to the United States in particular.”[1]

 

Fifteen months later, the situation is markedly different. The Obama Administration has replaced ad hoc policies with a comprehensive, pragmatic strategy that more aggressively targets Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists, while building the framework for an effective partnership with Pakistan to build sustainable security in the region. Although the terrorist threat remains grave, there are strong signs that the new approach is disrupting Taliban and al Qaeda operations and beginning to lay the groundwork for a longer-term campaign to deny terrorists support and safe haven in Pakistan.

 

The Obama Administration has made building a partnership with Pakistan a central U.S. national security priority. The previous Administration pursued a dangerously short-sighted and simplistic approach toward Pakistan. For years, it relied on a military strategy built primarily on a personal relationship with President Musharrafand, in effect, outsourced U.S. counterterrorism efforts to the Pakistani military – funneling $11 billion in military assistance to Pakistan with little oversight or accountability, and very few results. At the same time, the Bush Administration neglected critical development needs in Pakistan, failing to address root causes contributing to the growth of violent extremism in the region. While investing heavily in counterterrorism initiatives and military aid, nonmilitary assistance was virtually nonexistent: throughout Fiscal Years 2002-2007, just one percent of U.S. spending in Pakistan’s tribal region was devoted to development efforts. This fundamental imbalance not only prevented the development of a viable partnership with the Pakistani government, it also stymied our ability to effectively address the Taliban and al Qaeda threat and advance other central national security goals in the region.[2]

 

President Obama came to office pledging to overhaul these failing policies and took immediate, decisive action to develop a comprehensive strategy and build a more effective strategic relationship with the Pakistani government and its people – and advance critical U.S. national security goals in the region. Following a full-scale review of U.S. policy, the President outlined a comprehensive plan to integrate military, civilian, and intelligence resources toward a clear and narrowly defined goal of defeating al Qaeda and building the long-term capacity to prevent its return in the future. Over the past year, the Administration has continued to strengthen our relationship with Pakistan, providing a dramatic increase in development funding, a bolstered and more accountable military assistance program for improving Pakistani counterterrorism capabilities, and significantly enhanced efforts to combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

 

The Obama Administration has put in place a comprehensive civil-military strategy to address our national security interests in Pakistan.

 

 

The Administration has adopted a more aggressive counterterrorism strategy.

 

The Administration has bolstered assistance and support to Pakistan to build the capacity of its government and civilian institutions.

oStrategic Dialogue. Last month, the United States and Pakistan engaged in two days of high-level talks in an effort to move beyond military cooperation and build a more comprehensive partnership based on shared goals and increased trust. The so-called Strategic Dialogue included a series of working groups to discuss key issues of mutual concern, such as security, energy, agriculture, education, and economic issues. Top officials from both countries attended the dialogue, including Secretary of State Clinton, National Security Advisor Jim Jones, Secretary of Defense Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, Foreign Minister Qureshi, and General Kiyani, among others. As many experts have noted, such high-level talks are unprecedented in U.S.-Pakistani relations. Both sides agreed to redouble efforts to fight terrorism and advance shared values in order to promote peace and stability in the region. The U.S., through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) pledged to provide $51 million to upgrade three energy projects in Pakistan and also announced plans to reconstruct two roads in Pakistan of strategic importance. The next round of the Strategic Dialogue is scheduled to take place in Islamabad in the next six months.[9]

 

With the New Strategy in Place, There is Evidence That We Are Making Real Gains in the Fight Against al Qaeda 

Pakistan is showing new resolve in targeting domestic extremists. With greater support and increased pressure from the United States, the Pakistani government has taken the fight to the extremists. Over the past year it has arrested many key Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and launched offensives in Swat, South Waziristan, and throughout the country, in an effort to regain and hold key tribal areas, capture militants, and disrupt terrorist activities along the border with Afghanistan. 

The Pakistani military has stepped up its presence and operations in the tribal areas and border region. As the Brookings Institution’s Michael O’Hanlon recently underscored,“Total Pakistani troops in the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and the tribal areas now number about 150,000, up from 50,000 in 2001. In addition, there are 90,000 paramilitary troops of the Frontier Corps in the area, and they are far better equipped, paid and led than in years past.” Additionally, he noted that the Pakistani army now has 821 posts along the Afghan-Pakistan border and carried out more than 200 operations in 2009 – twice as many as in the previous years combined.[10]

While the increase in force presence and operations marks an important shift in Pakistan’s efforts to combat extremist activity inside its borders, the United States has been clear that there is more that Pakistan must do to take on the Taliban in other areas of the country. Officials and experts report that Pakistan has focused its operations on combating the so-called Pakistani Taliban (or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan [TTP]), and has proven largely unwilling, or unable, (with some notable exceptions) to go after the Quetta Shura Taliban (the top leadership of Afghan Taliban that is operating out of safe havens in the Balochistan province of Pakistan). As General McChrystal and other top military officials have made clear, the Quetta Shura Taliban is known to be directing the insurgency inside Afghanistan and poses the greatest challenge to our troops on the ground there. The Obama Administration has continued to pressure Pakistan’s leaders to build on their successes against al Qaeda, and target all of these extremist groups and to work to eliminate all terrorist safe havens.[11] While significant work remains to be done, U.S. efforts have already paid dividends. 

 

Marking a substantial shift over the past year, the Pakistani people increasingly back the military’s operations against Taliban insurgents. Recent surveys have shown that the Pakistani people are increasingly turning against the Taliban, voicing a new level of support for Pakistan’s military operations in the border and tribal areas. A recent report from Gallup stated that, “The Taliban’s presence on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is largely unwelcome, but increasingly so in Pakistan, where Gallup surveys show they have lost much of the little appeal they had. Four percent of Pakistanis in a November-December 2009 poll, conducted prior to Pakistan's current push to rout the Taliban within its borders, said the Taliban's presence in some areas of the country has a positive influence, down from 15% in June. Gallup most recently polled Pakistanis in the particularly deadly period after the army’s anti-Taliban operations in the South Waziristan tribal area started in October. Retributive militant attacks across Pakistan reportedly have claimed more than 600 Pakistanis’ lives since then, which the public's increasingly negative view of the Taliban may reflect.”[19]

 

Aggressive efforts have placed unprecedented pressure on al Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan and significantly weakened their ability to plan sophisticated operations.

Similarly, the Pentagon has asserted that the coordination between U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani forces has reached unprecedented levels and, as a result, has severely inhibited the cross-border movement of the Taliban. A senior Pentagon official recently stated, “…the coordination that we have now – it’s probably the best I’ve seen– between Afghanistan coalition forces, Afghan forces and the Pak[istani] military, coordinating on a daily basis with Regional Command East in the 11th Corps in operations, working together very closely.... And so that border that was very fluid now is starting to become problematic for the insurgencies to go back and forth.”[23]

According to spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban, Tariq Azam, drone attacks and Pakistani counterterrorism efforts have pushed their leadership to meet in secret, “Our meetings take place on a regular basis, but the leadership is underground due to security concerns…. It is not only because of drones, but the Pakistani Army, too, is targeting us.” Further, there is growing evidence of rising internal dissention within Taliban ranks. As a spokesman of one of the Taliban factions that split from the main group following the death of Baitullah Mehsudrecently stated, “Drone attacks have created a rift in the ranks as people are suspecting each other of spying.”[25]

Over the past year, Pakistan has demonstrated a new commitment to partnering with the United States and working toward shared goals of defeating al Qaeda and building sustainable security in the region. Speaking at the Strategic Dialogue in March, the Foreign Minister Qureshiunderscored support for a “robust engagement between Pakistan and the U.S.” as“critical for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region and the world.” He also stated that “Pakistan is committed to doing its part to facilitate the world’s community effort for peace and stability in Afghanistan.” Similarly, General Kayani has voiced support for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan and has actively worked to advance cooperation and coordination with the United States in order to deepen our strategic partnership.[26]


[1]Government Accountability Office, 4/08. National Intelligence Estimate, 7/17/07; McClatchy, 10/14/08; New York Times, 10/8/08.

[2]Government Accountability Office, 4/08; New York Times, 12/24/07; Government Accountability Office, 4/17/08; Center for American Progress, 4/23/08.

[3]Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 12/1/09.

[4]CQ Weekly, 1/4/10; Senator Lugar, Bill Summary; Senator Kerry, Press Release, 6/25/09.

[5]National Security Network, 6/1/09; Wall Street Journal, 5/16/09; New York Times, 10/17/09; Christian Science Monitor, 2/16/10.

[6]New America Foundation, 2/24/10; 4/16/10.

[7]President Obama, 3/27/09.

[8]Middle East Progress, 4/6/10.

[9]Middle East Progress, 4/6/10; The Hindu, 3/26/10.

[10]Michael O’Hanlon, New York Times op-ed, 3/24/10.

[11]BBC, 1/4/10; Council on Foreign Relations, 9/26/10; International Affairs Review, 11/23/09; Time, 4/17/10.

[12]Christian Science Monitor, 2/24/10; New York Times, 2/15/10; Financial Times, 4/4/10.

[13]Bloomberg, 4/14/10; New York Times, 4/12/10.

[14]Christian Science Monitor, 3/25/10.

[15]CentralAsiaOnline.com, 3/17/10; AFP, 4/1/10.

[16]The News, 4/22/10.

[17]AFP, 4/9/10; Reuters, 4/6/10; Bloomberg, 4/14/10.

[18]American Forces Press Service, 3/29/10; Guardian, 4/1/10.

[19]Pakistan Conflict Monitor, 3/17/10.

[20]Washington Post, 3/18/10.

[21]Media Roundtable with Gen. McChrystal,4/2/10.

[22]AFP, 4/14/10.

[23]Department of Defense, Background Briefing with a Senior Military Official from the Pentagon, 3/29/10.

[24]New York Times, 4/4/10.

[25]Christian Science Monitor, 3/15/10.

[26]Opening Session of the U.S-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, 3/24/10.