DPC Document

The State of Iraq: 2008

January 25, 2008

DPC Contact:

Kristin Devine

When President Bush unveiled his troop escalation plan for Iraqon January 10, 2007 he claimed that increased U.S. troop levels would provide a window of stability and security in which Iraqi leaders would be able to make the political compromises necessary to move forward with national reconciliation. In his speech, he highlighted the importance of security, economic and political benchmarks and pledged to “hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.” (President Bush, Address to the Nation, 1/10/07)

A year after the President’s announcement of his surge strategy, however, there is little evidence that progress is being made on its stated goal of political reconciliation or any indication that the Bush Administration is following through on its pledge to hold Iraqi leaders accountable. While there has been a reduction in the level of violence in certain parts of the country in recent months, experts and a growing number of military officials warn that the relative calm cannot be sustained without political progress. As the Pentagon stated in its latest report to Congress, “The key to long-term success will be the [Government of Iraq’s] ability to capitalize upon local [security] gains, pass key legislation, and promote national reconciliation.” (DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07)

It is clear that we cannot afford to continue with the Bush Administration’s failed stay-the-course strategy. Since the surge plan was announced, prospects for building a viable government in Iraqhave grown increasingly precarious; regional stability has continued to deteriorate; our military has been stretched closer to a breaking point; and we are less safe from the threat of terrorism. Democrats will continue to fight for a change of course that makes our country more secure.

The surge strategy has failed to achieve political reconciliation, the stated goal of the President’s escalation plan

In September, three separate assessments from independent experts and our intelligence community concluded that the Bush Administration’s surge plan had failed to achieve meaningful progress for national reconciliation in Iraq. The non-partisan Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Iraqi government had failed to meet 15 of 18 benchmarks for national reconciliation; our nation’s sixteen intelligence agencies assessed, in an August National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), that Iraq’s political leaders remain unable to govern effectively; and a group of security experts and former military officials, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, reported that Iraq’s security forces are increasingly infiltrated by sectarian militias, incapable of protecting its citizens and will not be able to operate independently for at least 12 to 18 months.

Instead of adopting a more effective strategy to advance reconciliation, the Bush Administration has persisted with its failed approach in Iraq. The result has been more of the same. According to independent experts, military officials, and on-the-ground reports, there has been no notable progress toward meeting critical political benchmarks necessary to achieve sustainable stability in Iraqin the year since the surge was announced.

Independent experts and top military and Bush Administration officials cite inadequate progress on key reconciliation measures

The GAO continues to report “limited progress” on national reconciliation.According to a recent GAO assessment, “The Iraqi government continues to make limited progress in meeting eight legislative benchmarks intended to promote national reconciliation. As of October 25, 2007, the Iraqi government had met one legislative benchmark and partially met another…The benchmark requiring a review of the Iraqi constitution has not yet been met. Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional review process…In addition five other legislative benchmarks requiring parliamentary action have not been met.” (GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, 10/30/07)

General Petraeus reports “halting” progress on political reconciliation and recognizes growing frustration among Iraq’s leaders.In late December General Petraeus,the top U.S.commander in Iraq, told reporters that Iraqhas made “halting” steps toward political reconciliation. Responding to concerns highlighted by the Pentagon’s latest report on security and stability in Iraq, General Petraeus stated, “I understand the impatience; in fact, it is shared by Iraqi leaders.” (Bloomberg, 12/23/07)

General Odierno stated that there has not been sufficient political progress.The number two commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Odiernorecently acknowledged that there has not been adequate progress toward reconciliation – “I think we now have security at a level where we have to now look at other things: the increase of services to the people, the increase of political accommodation at the local level, the provincial level…But we have not made the progress we want yet.” (Los AngelesTimes, 12/3/07)

Ambassador Crocker has acknowledged that Iraq’s leaders are failing to cooperate at the national level.As NPR recently reported, “The U.S. military has been busy getting Sunni and Shiite leaders to work together at the local level, but Crocker acknowledges that this has not been replicated by Iraqi officials at the national level. ‘That’s got to happen or nothing good is coming down the line,’ he says.” (NPR, Morning Edition, 1/9/08)

Realities on the ground in Iraqshow that the Bush plan is failing to advance national reconciliation.

Sectarian violence has continued, despite surge. Despite a downward trend in violence in recent months, sectarian killings have continued in Baghdad and across the country, while new threats of sectarian cleansing have emerged. In its December quarterly report to Congress, the Pentagon warned that “Shi’aextremist and criminal activities have become growing threats to security and stability as the role of insurgents and [al Qaeda in Iraq] wanes.” This threat has become increasingly evident over the past several months as a growing tide of attacks and suicide bombings have targeted key Sunni leaders cooperating with the U.S.efforts against al Qaeda and other extremist elements in Iraq. (DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07; Christian Science Monitor, 1/2/08)

In a recent special report, the U.S. Institute of Peace described the evolving nature of Iraq’s sectarian violence, “The lawless conditions originally triggered by terrorist attacks (presumed to be Sunni), counterattacks by militias (presumed to be Shi’a), and the impotence of Iraqi security forces in effect paved the way for other forms of violence cloaked in sectarian garb. Violence in neighborhoods now includes family vendettas avenging former murders and assassinations or revenge killing of former Baathists accused of criminality under the previous regime. The skein of violence is further tangled by the proliferation of gangs that are mini-mafias masquerading as sectarian or political militias.”(U.S. Institute of Peace, 12/07)

Experts warn that the recent decline in violence is largely the result of ethnic cleansing and population displacement, not reconciliation. Many experts strongly contest the assumption asserted by the Bush Administration that data showing lower numbers of sectarian attacks in the latter part of 2007 signals a decrease in sectarianism or the threat of sectarian violence. They say that a key reason for the decline in violence has been the growing separation between Iraq’s main ethnic groups, particularly in Baghdad, where most neighborhoods have been divided along sectarian lines, separated by concrete walls and security checkpoints, and where tens of thousands have been forced to flee their homes. As a recent analysis from the Asia Timesexplains, “Sunni-Shi’ite violence, which spiraled out of control following the Samarramosque bombing in early 2006, has eased. This has not been due to any reconciliation between the sects, but rather because sectarian violence over the past two-and-a-half years has turned most of Baghdad and a few other major cities into homogeneous semi-fortified enclaves. Mixed neighborhoods have all but disappeared. Furthermore, two million or so Sunnis have fled to foreign countries. With so much forced dislocation, the opportunity for sectarian violence is down. (AsiaTimes, 12/14/07)

Military officials report that Sunnis have essentially been ethnically cleansed from Baghdad. According to the Iraq Red Crescent, the number of displaced Iraqis quadrupled during the surge, with an estimated eight in ten refugees having fled Baghdad. American military officials also have reported clear signs of ethnic cleansing in Baghdadsince the surge began, estimating that the city has gone from being 65 percent Sunni to being 75 percent Shiite. (Inter Press Service, 12/29/07; McClatchy, 9/9/07)

The Iraqi government remains weak and divided along sectarian lines, unable to advance a national agenda. Contrary to the intent of the surge strategy, divisions within the Malikigovernment have grown significantly over the past year. As the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, “splits within the power structure, both between the Shiite and other blocks, and even within the Sunni bloc, widened during 2007. Several major political blocs pulled their numbers out of the cabinet in 2007, leaving Maliki, at one point, with 16 out of 37 total positions vacant held by acting ministers, or their ministers boycotting the cabinet.” At the same time that Iraq’s central government has grown increasingly dysfunctional and unrepresentative,it has failed to advance any effective solutions to the country’s many challenges. Joost Hiltermann, an Iraq expert with the International Crisis Group, recently warned that “Iraq is moving in the direction of a failed state, a highly decentralized situation…with competing centers of power run by warlords and militias… The central government has no political control whatsoever beyond Baghdad, maybe not even beyond the Green Zone.” (CRS, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, 12/18/07; Los AngelesTimes, 12/10/07)

“Bottom-up”reconciliation is not happening. Contrary to the Bush Administration’s claims, the U.S. supported Awakening Councils in Iraq – largely credited for the decline in violence in recent months – are not reconciling with the Iraqi government. As the New York Times recently reported, “Officials attribute the relative calm to a huge increase in the number of Sunni Arab rebels who have turned their guns on jihadistsinstead of American troops; a six-month halt to military action by the militia of a top Shiite leader, Moktada al-Sadr; and the increased number of American troops on the streets here. They stress that all of these changes can be reversed, and on relatively short notice…The Sunni insurgents who turned against the jihadists are now expecting to be rewarded with government jobs. Yet, so far, barely 5 percent of the 77,000 Sunni volunteers have been given jobs in the Iraqi security forces…” Analysts warn that this policy has sharpened divisions between Iraq’s Shi’asand Sunnis, as the vast majority of these volunteers – an estimated 82 percent– are Sunni Muslims. Prime Minister Maliki has remained wary of these groups and opposes integrating them into Iraq’s security forces, raising concerns about prospects for near and long-term reconciliation. (New YorkTimes, 12/5/07; Inter Press Service, 12/29/07)
Corruption in Iraqhas reached unprecedented levels, undermining government effectiveness and legitimacy. According to independent analysis by Transparency International, Iraqis now ranked the third most corrupt country in the world, behind only Somalia and Myanmar among the 180 countries surveyed. As a recent New York Timesarticle warned, “there is a growing sense that, even as security has improved, Iraqhas slipped to new depths of lawlessness.” According to the article, some American officials estimate that as much as a third of U.S. funding for Iraqi grants and contracts ends up stolen or unaccounted for while Iraqi officials estimate that $18 billion Iraqi government funds have been stolen since 2004. This widespread corruption, it concludes, “undermines Iraq’s ability to provide essential services, a key to sustaining recent security gains, according to American military commanders. It also sows a corrosive distrust of democracy and hinders reconciliation as entrenched groups in the Shiite-led government resist reforms that would cut into reliable cash flows.”(New YorkTimes, 12/02/07)
Iraq’s Security Forces – particularly, its national police force – continues to be infiltrated by militias and other extremist elements. According to the December 2007 DoDquarterly report to Congress, “internal sectarian biases, commissioned and noncommissioned officer shortfalls, logistics deficiencies, and a dependence on Coalition forces continue to hinder the Iraq’ forces’ ability to operate without Coalition assistance.” The Pentagon found that “corruption and sectarian behavior continue to be evident” in the Ministry of Interior and reported that nearly 200 police were fired for “militia activity and involvement in corruption” in the last quarter. (DoD,Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07)

·U.S.commanders in Iraq still cannot trust their Iraqi counterparts. Media reports indicate that American commanders remain too wary of the Iraqi police and army to inform them of significant military operations until they are underway. As recently as June, a planned U.S.-led campaign to retake Baqubah was apparently leaked to insurgents, compromising the operation’s effort to route out al Qaeda fighters there. This distrust is reportedly the reason that U.S.military officials refused to tell Iraqi security forces about the latest offensive launched against al Qaeda in Iraq’s Diyalaprovince this past week. (Slate, 1/9/08)

·Analysts doubt the capacity of Iraq’s security forces to eliminate sectarian militias and combat al Qaeda and insurgent fighters. To date, the U.S. has been unable to hand over control of provinces with large Sunni Arab populations to Iraq’s police and army forces. According to analysts, mutual distrust between the Shiite-dominated provincial governments and security forces and the Sunni population has undermined efforts to bridge sectarian divides in more ethnically mixed areas of Iraq. While Sunnis “perceive a continuing need to ally themselves with al-Qaida in Mesopotamia or the Sunni insurgency so that the community is capable of opposing the Shiite-dominated Iraqi security forces,” Shiites perceive a need to maintain sectarian militias and resist incorporating Sunnis into the provincial government and security structure. Given this complicated dynamic, experts warn that the U.S.counterinsurgency effort that had been successful in Anbarprovince may not be effective in mixed areas like Diyalaprovince, which raises larger concerns about Iraq’s ability to maintain stability in areas secured by U.S. forces. (Reuters, 1/11/08; Slate, 1/9/08)

·U.S.and Iraqi military officials estimate that Iraq’s security forces could require U.S. military support for as long as a decade. In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, head of the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq, U.S. Army Lt. General James Dubik cited several critical concerns about Iraq’s security forces, including “rampant” corruption, continued sectarianism, a shortage of mid-level officers, as well as considerable gaps in equipment supplies and key logistics capabilities. And in an interview last week, Iraqi Defense Minister, Abdul Qadir stated that“According to our calculations and our timelines, we think that from the first quarter of 2009 until 2012 we will be able to take full control of the internal affairs of the country” and that, “In regard to the borders, regarding protection from any external threats, our calculation appears that we are not going to be able to answer to any external threats until 2018 to 2020.” (Lt. Gen. Dubik testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 1/17/08; New YorkTimes, 1/15/08)

Bush Promises not kept: there has been no forward progress on key reconciliation initiatives outlined in his January 2007 speech.

In his speech last January, President Bush highlighted several critical initiatives to promote political reconciliation in Iraq. To date, the Administration’s strategy has proven ineffective in pushing the Iraqi government to make forward progress on these critical initiatives.

Questionable progress: recently-passed legislation to reform de-Baathificationlaws could actually mark setback in reconciliation efforts. In his January 2007 speech, President Bush stated that, “To allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation’s political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws.” Although the Iraqi parliament did approve de-Baathificationlegislation this past week, known as the Justice and Accountability Law, analysts caution that “the legislation is at once confusing and controversial, a document riddled with loopholes and caveats to the point that some Sunni and Shiite officials say it could actually exclude more former Baathiststhan it lets back in, particularly in the crucial security ministries.” Under these interpretations, experts say that the law could effectively undermine plans to integrate Sunni Arabs who have joined the U.S.-supported“Awakening” groups into Iraq’s police and military forces. As one Sunni politician stated, “Many Baathists hated the Baath Party, but they were part of it to have a job…By this law, we will push them into the insurgency.” (New YorkTimes, 1/14/08)

U.S.and Iraqi officials warn that the new law could actually force more-ex-Baathists out of government jobs. The Washington Postreports that, “More than a dozen Iraqi lawmakers, U.S.officials and former Baathists here and in exile expressed concern in interviews that the law could set off a new purge of ex-Baathists, the opposite of U.S. hopes for the legislation. Approved by parliament this month under pressure from U.S. officials, the law was heralded by President Bush and Iraqi leaders as a way to soothe the deep anger of many ex-Baathists – primarily Sunnis but also many Shiites such as Awadi – toward the Shiite-led government. Yet U.S.officials and even legislators who voted for the measure, which still requires approval by Iraq's presidency council, acknowledge that its impact is hard to assess from its text and will depend on how it is implemented.” (WashingtonPost, 1/23/08)

Security responsibility has not been handed over to Iraqi security forces as promised. In his speech, President Bush outlined plans for the transfer of security responsibility to Iraqi forces, “to establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November.” Yet, by the end of 2007, Iraq’s security forces had assumed control over just nine of Iraq’s 18 provinces. (NPR, Morning Edition, 1/7/08)

Oil legislation continues to be delayed. The Maliki government pledged to enact a law to establish a national plan for the regulation of Iraq’s oil industry and the distribution of oil revenues by the end of 2006.In his January 2007 speech, the President promised to hold the Iraqi government accountable for progress in this critical area, which is widely seen as the key to Iraq’s reconstruction and long-term economic development and as well as critical to creating political unity in the country. However, according to the Pentagon’s December quarterly report, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, the framework law remains with the Iraqi Parliament and “no action has been taken on it.” Although a deal had reportedly been reached this summer, consensus between Iraq’s main political and ethnic groups has fallen apart as the Kurds passed their own oil law in July 2007 and since signed 15 new oil and gas development agreements with foreign partners. (DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07; New YorkTimes, 9/13/07)

Provincial elections have been postponed indefinitely. President Bush also stated that “to empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year.” Despite this pledge, elections have not been held. According to media reports, Iraq’s fragmented parliament has been unable to work out a power-sharing arrangement necessary to move forward with provincial elections. This political impasse poses a serious challenge to larger national reconciliation initiatives. Because Iraq’s Sunni Arab population largely boycotted the January 2005 elections, they have been largely underrepresented in provincial councils, even in predominately Sunni regions. Reconciling this imbalance is seen as critical to ensuring Sunni buy-in to the political process and moving forward with larger national reconciliation among Iraq’s three main ethnic groups. (Los AngelesTimes, 1/3/08)

The constitutional amendment process has been stalled. President Bush also stated that, “To allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation’s political life, the government will…establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq’s constitution.” One year later, however, there has been little measurable progress. The constitutional amendment process has been undermined by internal divisions, with Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites reportedly split over key issues. After belatedly delivering some recommendations for constitutional amendments in May 2007, the constitutional review committee (CRC) has remained divided over the most fundamental and sensitive issues, including the distribution of oil revenue and power-sharing arrangements between the central government and provinces. (CRS, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, 12/18/07; Brookings Institution, IraqIndex, 1/3/08)

Reconstruction spending has fallen significantly short of goals. President Bush pledged that, “To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs.” Yet, as NPR recently reported, “By year’s end, Iraq had spent about $3 billion of the $10 billion Bush said it would spend. American officials say the Iraqis still don’t have a competent bureaucracy to distribute money. And in some areas, they say, money is withheld because of sectarian reasons.” (NPR, Morning Edition, 1/7/08)

Political Progress Will Remain Out Of Reach Under The Bush Administration’s Flawed Stay-The-Course Strategy

Independent experts assessed that the Bush Administration lacks an effective strategy for advancing political reconciliation in Iraq.

The GAO identified significant weaknesses in the Bush strategy. In an October report, the GAO warned that, “U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and performance measures. The U.S.strategy for victory in Iraqpartially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy and does not fully address how the United States would integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministry capability lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S.priorities have been subject to numerous changes. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqi government’s lack of integrated strategic planning in its critical energy sector.” (GAO, Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq, 10/30/07)

The Administration’s current policies are working against reconciliation goals; military leaders fear a backlash.

Military officials report that Sunnis are cooperating with theU.S. in a bid to buy time, and warn that the Administration’s Awakening Councils are exacerbating distrust between Iraq’s Sunnis and the Shiite-led central government. Military officials have reported that most of the Iraqi participants in the Awakening Councils, known as Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) have no interest in joining Iraq’s security forces. They say that the Iraqi volunteers, mostly former resistance fighters and militia members, joined the CLC program primarily for the prospect of a monthly paycheck and remain distrusting of the Shiite government and security forces. As the Washington Post recently reported, “In interviews over the past month, several Awakening leaders and foot soldiers said they wanted to ensure their community’s survival by bringing services and economic development to their areas. They are hardening their grip over Sunni enclaves throughout the country, weakening the central government’s authority.”(Time, 12/24/07; Asia Times, 12/21/07; WashingtonPost, 1/8/08)

U.S.and Iraqi officials warn that the recent targeting of Awakening Council members is threatening to undermine the program – the central pillar of the Bush Administration’s stabilization strategy. As the New York Timesrecently reported, “At least 100 predominantly Sunni militiamen, known as Awakening Council members or Concerned Local Citizens, have been killed in the past month, mostly around Baghdadand the provincial capital of Baquba, urban areas with mixed Sunni and Shiite populations, according to Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani. At least six of the victims were senior Awakening leaders, Iraqi officials said. Violence is also shaking up the Awakening movement, many of whose members are former insurgents, in its birthplace in the Sunni heartland of AnbarProvince.” Further, the Times article states that “the recent onslaught is jeopardizing that relative security and raising the prospect that the groups’ members might disperse, with many rejoining the insurgency, American officials said.” (New YorkTimes, 1/24/08)

The Administration’s military escalation plan has sharpened Shiite confrontation in Iraq’s southern provinces.According recent Washington Post analysis, “This year’s U.S.military offensive and dramatic shifts in tactics by both Sunni and Shiite groups are redrawing the balance of power across Iraq. With less violence between Sunnis and Shiites, festering struggles within each community may come to define the nature of the conflict. In the Shiite-dominated south, Sadr’s main Shiite rivals are taking advantage of the surge in U.S.troops, as well as Sadr’s imposition of a freeze on operations by his Mahdi Army militia, to make political gains.” Further, the article states that, U.S.forces have arrested hundreds of Mahdi Army militia members in Baghdad, creating voids in the leadership. This has emboldened Iraq’s mostly Shiite security forces, loyal to the Supreme Council and other political parties, to reach for power in the south.” (WashingtonPost, 12/25/07)

The Bush Administration’s limited diplomatic initiatives are falling far short of the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations for a “new diplomatic offensive.”

One of the Iraq Study Group’s most important recommendations in its December 2006 final report called for the immediate launching of a “new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and in the region.” The bipartisan group of experts advocated building a support structure that would include all of Iraq’s neighbors and called for“regional and international initiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones.” Although the Bush Administration has recently demonstrated a new willingness to engage Iraq’s neighbors, its diplomatic efforts have remained far too limited. According to a recent analysis by the U.S. Institute of Peace, “The United States, despite its demand for the Iraqi government to meet benchmarks, has not made the political process in Iraqits highest priority. Washingtonhas not mobilized its considerable political and diplomatic capabilities to confront what is undoubtedly the most critical problem endangering regional security.” (U.S. Institute of Peace, December 2007)

The Bush strategy has failed to keep Iraqfrom becoming a battleground for regional power struggles.

Irancontinues to provide funding and critical support to sectarian militia groups in Iraq.In December, the Pentagon reported that “There has been no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi’a militias in Iraq. Tehran’s support for Shi’a militant groups who attack Coalition and Iraqforces remains a significant impediment towards stabilization.” (DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07)
Syriacontinues to serve as a key sanctuary and primary entry point for foreign fighters operating in Iraq.The Pentagon’s quarterly report also stated that “Terrorists, foreign fighters, and former regime elements continue to find sanctuary, border transit opportunities and logistical support in Syria. Syria is estimated to be the entry point for 90% of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq.” (DoD,Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07)
The threat of a Turkish invasion of Iraqi Kurdistancontinues to loom. The Bush Administration’s failure to develop a comprehensive policy to deal with the separatist Kurdish rebel group, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), operating in Northern Iraq has led to considerable tension between Iraq, Turkeyand the United Statesand heightened the threat of a full-scale Turkish military invasion. In the past few months, Turkeyhas led several military incursions into Kurdistan against the PKK, threatening to undermine stability in Iraq’s Northern region, which has been an area of relative calm and economic development. (New York Times, 12/20/07; Los AngelesTimes, 12/29/07)

The Bush Administration’s flawed Iraqstrategy has led to massive displacement of Iraqis both inside the country and to neighboring states, threatening regional stability.The nonpartisan organization Refugees International warns that Iraqrepresents “the world’s fastest growing refugee crisis.” According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), an estimated 2.3 million Iraqis have been internally displaced, while another 2.3 million have fled as refugees, primarily to neighboring countries. More than 1.5 million Iraqis are now living in Syria, upwards of 750,000 Iraqis have fled to Jordan, while hundreds of thousands of others have sought refuge in Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran and Yemen. While these countries are quickly becoming overwhelmed by the massive influx of refugees, Iraqis are facing growing restrictions inside these host countries, where they often have to pay for basic services, are denied employment opportunities, and face the constant threat of deportation. (Refugees International, 10/23/07)

Bush Administration Officials, Top Military Leaders Are Now Conceding That Recent Security Improvements Are Unsustainable In The Absence of Political Progress

Bush Administration officials, top military leaders are now conceding that recent security gains are unsustainable unless real political progress is made.

U.S. Secretary of State John Negroponte recently stated that “progress on political reconciliation…is needed to consolidate gains made thus far…If progress is not made on these fronts, we risk falling back to the more violent patterns of the past.” (Los AngelesTimes, 12/307)
In an end of the year briefing, General David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, stated that progress in curbing sectarian violence in Iraq has been “tenuous in many areas and could be reversed.” (Reuters, 12/29/07)
Major General Rick Lynch, a senior U.S.military official in Iraq, warned that recent security gains are fragile and could be reversed. Speaking to reporters, he stated that the security situation “is tenuous at best. On any given day the security situation could go backward by some catastrophic attack, or by the local population not seeing continued forward progress.” (Associated Press, 1/3/08)

Without political reconciliation, experts warn that the current lull in violence is simply the calm before the storm.

Iraq analyst Joost Hilterman with the International Crisis Group recently told reporters that “We are in a holding pattern…The military solution has gained enough peace to last through the U.S. election, but we have a situation that is extremely fragile. None of the violent actors have either been defeated or prevailed, and the political roots of the conflict have not been addressed, much less resolved.” (New YorkTimes, 12/5/07)

Al Qaeda and other terrorist elements have not been eliminated in the security crackdown; suggesting.According to a recent report from the U.S. Institute for Peace, “Iraqi securityofficials are concerned that terrorists squeezed out of Anbar,Diyala, and the area south of Baghdadare moving to Kirkuk, where suicide bombings have risen dramatically, and Salaheddin, and worry that Mosul…so far relatively quiet, will be the new frontier for terrorists.” (U.S. Institute of Peace, 12/07)

Moqtadaal Sadr’s Shiite militia is reportedly using the current cease fire as an opportunity to reconstitute and strengthen his forces.As the Christian Science Monitor reports, “Sadr’s top aides say the anti-American cleric is anything but idle. Instead, he is orchestrating a revival among his army of loyalists entrenched in Baghdad and Shiite enclaves to the south – from the religious centers of Karbalaand Najaf to the economic hub of Basra. What is in the making, they say, is a better-trained and leaner force free of rogue elements accused of atrocities and crimes during the height of the sectarian war last year. Many analysts say what may reemerge is an Iraqi version of Lebanon’s Hizbullah – a state within a state that embraces politics while maintaining a separate military and social structure that holds powerful sway at home and in the region.” (Christian Science Monitor, 12/11/07)

Pentagon report: Sunnis’ tactical alliance with the U.S. could easily unravel, leading to a revival of militia groups and increased violence. The Pentagon has raised serious concerns that security improvements will be reversed over the next year, as the U.S.-funded program ends and tens of thousands of armed Sunnis could become unemployed. As its latest quarterly report to Congress warns, “The CLC program is proving crucial to the counterinsurgency effort but the slow pace of integrating the CLC members into GoI [Iraqi government institutions], lack of alternative employment and fears by the Maliki government that these forces may return to violence or form new militias are of concern.” (DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07)

The Surge One Year Later:
The Status of National Reconciliation

Bush Pledge	Status	Anticipated Obstacles to Progress
Transfer security responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces by November 2007.	Unfulfilled: As of the end of 2007, Iraq’s Security Forces had assumed control over only nine of Iraq’s 18 provinces.	According to the Pentagon’s latest quarterly report to Congress, cites significant readiness shortfalls facing the Iraqi Army due to its limited capacity to handle logistics, inadequate training, as well as a shortage of officers needed for critical leadership roles. The report states that it will “take years” for the Army to build the capacity to operate independently of the U.S. forces. (DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07)
Hold the Iraqi government accountable to its plan to establish a fair process for considering amendments to the constitution.	Unfulfilled:In May 2007, the constitutional review committee (CRC) delivered some recommendations for amendments, but left key issues unaddressed. The CRC has yet to release its report on final recommendations.	According to a recent CRS report, “…factions reportedly remain divided over the same fundamental questions that divided Iraq’s communities when the permanent constitution was passed in October 2005 – primarily, how much power individual regions will have versus the powers of the central government. Sunnis reportedly seek to alter the constitution so as or facilitate the appointment of a Sunni Arab as president. Also at issue is the Kirkuk referendum. (CRS, 12/18/07)
Hold the Iraqi government accountable to its pledge to reform de-Baathification laws.	Questionable Progress: On January 12, 2008, the Iraqi Parliament passed de-Baathification reform legislation, known as the Justice and Accountability Law.	Initial media reports warn that this legislation may not signal progress on national reconciliation; that the law could effectively set-back political reconciliation between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites. As the New York Times reported, “the legislation is at once confusing and controversial, a document riddled with loopholes and caveats to the point that some Sunni and Shiite officials say it could actually exclude more former Baathists than it lets back in, particularly in the crucial security ministries.” Some Sunni political leaders warned that the new law could push many Sunnis into the insurgency and heighten sectarian conflict in Iraq. (New YorkTimes, 1/14/08)
Hold the Iraqi government accountable to its plan to pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis.	Unfulfilled: On July 3, 2007, Iraq’s cabinet approved a final version of the framework law and forwarded the bill to the Iraqi Parliament (COR) for consideration. To date, the COR has taken no action on the bill.	Although a deal on the framework law had reportedly been reached this summer, consensus between Iraq’s main political and ethnic groups has since fallen apart as the Kurds passed their own oil law in July 2007 and signed 15 new oil and gas development agreements with foreign partners. (New YorkTimes, 9/13/07)
Hold the Iraqi government accountable to its plan to hold provincial elections in 2007.	Unfulfilled: No date has been set for holding provincial elections.	Shiite and Kurdish factions are reportedly blocking the development of electoral legislation, undermining plans for holding elections. (CRS, 12/18/07)
Hold the Iraqi government accountable to its plan to spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects.	Unfulfilled: Iraqi leaders have not reached any political agreements for dismantling Iraq’s militia groups.	According to the Pentagon, sectarian militia groups have infiltrated much of Iraq’s police and national security forces. Analysts say that some of these groups have ties to elements within the Iraqi government, receive support from foreign governments, while some also play an important role in providing security to areas of the country.

Other sources for chart: Brookings Institution, Iraq Index; 1/3/08; CRS, CRS, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, 12/18/07; Department of Defense, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, 12/14/07)