DPC REPORTS

 

DPC | January 22, 2007

Senate Oversight Highlights Week of January 15, 2007

“It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents…” — Woodrow Wilson

Congress has the Constitutional responsibility to perform oversight of the Executive Branch and matters of public interest. This report summarizes highlights from each week’s Senate oversight hearings.

  

Tuesday, January 16, 2007: Senate Judiciary Committee

“The Plight of Iraqi Refugees”

  • According to the United Nations, more than 3.5 million Iraqis have been internally displaced or have fled the country to countries in the region.
     
  • The Iraq Study Group found that the United States bears a large part of the responsibility for the plight of Iraqi refugees. 

 

Wednesday, January 17: Senate Foreign Relations Committee

“Securing America’s Interests in Iraq: The Remaining Options: Regional Diplomatic Strategy”

  • All three witnesses highlighted the importance of regional dialogue for achieving stability and moving toward a resolution of the conflict in Iraq.
     
  • Witnesses testified that the Administration’s policies in Iraq have undermined stability in the Middle East, emboldened Iran, and effectively weakened U.S. influence in the region.

 

Wednesday, January 17: Senate Armed Services Committee, Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee

“Abusive Practices in Department of Defense Contracting for Services and Inter-agency Contracting”

  • The Department of Defense (DoD) has “parked” up to $2 billion in appropriated funds at the Department of the Interior, allowing the Pentagon to maintain current funding levels, to compensate for its own contracting shortcomings, and to hire particular contractors without full competition.
     
  • DoDunnecessarily spent $23 million on fees charged by the interagency contracting office at the Department of the Interior, then failed to monitor that office’s performance.
     
  • Interagency contracting arrangements allowed DoD to avoid congressional oversight of a $100 million lease arranged for Counterintelligence Field Activity, a DoD counterintelligence program.

 

Thursday, January 18: Senate Foreign Relations Committee

“Securing America’s Interests in Iraq: The Remaining Options: Military and Security Strategy”

  • General Barry McCaffrey (Ret.) warned of the growing crisis in Iraq, which the United States increasingly faces alone. 
     
  • According to General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Ret.), the President’s surge strategy is unlikely to succeed.
     
  • Lt. General William E. Odom (Ret.), former director of the National Security Agency, believes the President’s new strategy in Iraq is flawed, and could further escalate the conflict.

 

Thursday, January 18: Senate Judiciary Committee

“Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice”

  • Attorney General Gonzales failed to answer how many U.S. Attorneys have been asked to resign, or why, but pledged to seek Senate confirmation of all replacements. 
     
  • Attorney General Gonzales claimed that the Constitution does not provide an express habeas corpus right. 
     
  • Attorney General Gonzales declined to say whether the Administration would object to the FISA court voluntarily sending copies of its decision to the Judiciary Committee.
     
  • Attorney General Gonzales refused to explain why the Administration needed three years to seek FISA approval for its warrantless wiretapping program, or whether the Administration will act outside FISA in the future.

 

Thursday, January 18: Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee

“An Oversight Hearing on Oil and Gas Royalty Management”

  • The Mineral Management Service (MMS) said lost revenues due to a lack of price thresholds in 1998 and 1999 leases could exceed $10 billion.
     
  • The Inspector General at the Department of the Interior called MMS’s response “a shockingly cavalier management approach” to a very serious problem.

  

Tuesday, January 16, 2007: Senate Judiciary Committee
“The Plight of Iraqi Refugees”

According to the United Nations, more than 3.5 million Iraqis have been internally displaced or have fled the country to countries in the region.

“According to the High Commissioner for Refugees, 1.7 million people have been driven from their homes, up to 2 million have sought refuge in neighboring countries, at least 700,000 in Jordan, 600,000 in Syria, 80,000 in Egypt, 54,000 in Iran, and 20,000 in Lebanon. . . . And more than 10 percent of the people of Iraqare refugees. And we will see increasin[g] numbers as sectarian, ethnic and generalized violence continue unabated.” (Testimony of Senator Edward Kennedy, supported by the testimony of Michael Gabaudan, Regional Representative for the U.S. and Caribbean Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
 

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees warns that Iraqi refugees will suffer if the strain on host countries in the region is not alleviated.

While “host countries have been generous in receiving arriving Iraqis, effectively tolerating their presence for limited periods of stay. . . We are . . . increasingly concerned about reports of deportations and denial of access at the borders, and this reflects the strain that large refugee population have placed on host societies.” (Testimony of Michael Gabaudan, Regional Representative for the U.S. and CaribbeanOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

 

The living conditions for Iraqi refugees are deteriorating.

“Living conditions for refugees who remain in host countries are also deteriorating. Families have either depleted the resources that they brought with them or lacked resources to begin with. In the context, some women may be vulnerable to forced prostitution and young people to child labor. Some 30 percent of Iraqi children are not attending school, and access to health care is seriously limited.” (Testimony of Michael Gabaudan, Regional Representative for the U.S. and CaribbeanOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

 

The Iraq Study Group found that the United States bears a large part of the responsibility for the plight of Iraqi refugees.

“Like other aspects of the war, we bear a heavy responsibility for [the refugees’] plight. As the Iraq Study Group states, events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions. The study group concluded that if this refugee situation is not addressed, Iraq and the region could further be stabilized and the humanitarian suffering could be severe. America must respond.” (Testimony of Senator Edward Kennedy)

 

The United Stateshas not admitted its fair share of Iraqi refugees, even those refugees who have helped us.

While other countries have accepted hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees, the United Stateshas only admitted 466 refugees since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. (Testimony of Ellen Sauerbrey, Assistant Secretary of State Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State) Last year, “the United States admitted only 202 Iraqi refugees. A special immigrant visa program for U.S. military and Afghan translators currently has a six-year waiting list. . . . The answer, of course, is not to bring every Iraqi refugee to the United States, but we do have a special obligation to keep faith with the Iraqis who have bravely worked for us and often paid a terrible price for it, by providing them with safe refuge.”(Testimony of Senator Edward Kennedy) As noted by Senator Leahy, “We should not repeat the tragic and immoral mistake from the Vietnam era and leave friends without a refuge and, of course, subject to very violent and often deadly reprisals.” (Testimony of Senator Patrick Leahy)

 

Iraqi refugees provided emotional testimony on the dangers faced by Iraqis who help the United States.

“I am saddened to say that the number of Iraqis who have lost their lives for the cause of freedom and democracy in Iraq is too long to recount today. Let me give you one example. Samir, the lead interpreter for the task force public affairs office was excecuted by several gunmen on a crowded street on his way to work. After being taken hostage by insurgents, he attempted to escape from his captors because he knew better than anyone the horrible fate that Iraqis who worked for coalition forces faced…I, too, have been targeted for my death . . . because they believed I was a traitor…I was seriously injured in a targeted car bombing…I am lucky to be alive.” (Testimony of “Sami,” a former interpreter and translator with the United States and the coalition forces of Mosul)
 

The United Nations has often given up on resettling Iraqis in the United Statesdue to long delays.

“[F]rom 2003 through 2006, UNHCR was compelled to direct most Iraqi referrals to other resettlement countries [instead of the United States] because many departures were long delayed and in some cases approved cases were actually never able to depart to the United States. . . . We trust that in the future these obstacles can be avoided and that the U.S.material support and related bars will not pose new barriers to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees.” (Testimony of Michael Gabaudan, Regional Representative for the U.S. and CaribbeanOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

 

An exchange with the wife of slain reporter Steven Vincent and Senator Specter raised concerns about American motivations in helping refugees.

MS. RAMACI-VINCENT: To be honest, the impression that I got from the person who told this to me was that certain elements in the government are not willing to acknowledge the fact that Iraq is a titular democracy but not necessarily a working one --

SEN. SPECTER: How about that?

MS. RAMACI-VINCENT: -- and that by allowing more refugees into the country, it would be some kind of admission of failure on the part of the American government to have a fully functioning democracy to protect the citizens of Iraq.

SEN. SPECTER: Are you saying that’s the attitude of the American government not to want to recognize that Iraqis not a democracy and there’s a need for refugee status?

MS. RAMACI-VINCENT: No, elements in the government, not the American government as a whole.

SEN. SPECTER: Well, any elements are elements too many.
 

The wife of slain reproter Steven Vincent pleaded with the United States to increase their aid to the refugee effort.

“Because of our role in the conflict, I think we should consider doubling [our] contribution for Iraqi refugee, because fast action is what’s going to save more lives. The host countries, particularly Jordan and Syria, need multilateral and bilateral assistance in shouldering the burden of the refugee population. This means programs to resettle the most vulnerable refugees to third countries and help in sharing the costs of those who stay. The worst outcome . . . would be to see Syriaand Jordanclose their borders to Iraqis. . . Iraqis who are unable to flee the coutry are now in a queue awaiting their turn to die.” (Lisa Ramaci-Vincent, Executive Director, Steven Vincent Foundation)
 

Wednesday, January 17: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
“Securing America’s Interests in Iraq: The Remaining Options:
Regional Diplomatic Strategy”

 

Ambassador Haass disagrees with the Administration’s refusal to directly engage Iran and Syria.

SEN. BIDEN: [Secretary Rice] indicated that direct negotiations with Syria and Iran would be -- her words were, quote “puts us in a role of supplicant,” end of quote, it would be, quote“extortion;” end of quote, not diplomacy. You’ve spoken to this. Can you tell me why there are those -- and because these are very bright and respected people -- why they would view it as extortion and/or us being a supplicant? 

AMBASSADOR HAASS: I always think negotiations have two real purposes. One is to potentially reach an agreement; the other is to clarify. If they don’t succeed and if it turns out that Iran and Syria are being outrageous in their demands, then I think that can be quite useful for the secretary of State and others as they go about trying to build regional and global support for some sort of a sanction. So again, I don’t understand -- let me put this way. I don’t agree with the reluctance to negotiate, but I do believe it largely stems from an assessment that our relative position has worsened. Let me say one other thing very quickly. There’s an irony here, because when our relative position was quite strong several years ago, we also refused to negotiate.

 

All three witnesses highlighted the importance of regional dialogue for achieving stability and moving toward a resolution of the conflict in Iraq.

HAGEL: Where do we go from here? 

AMBASSADOR HAASS: Three things on the diplomatic side, again -- a regional forum I would support, again, modeled on the Afghan experience; American support, rather than resistance, to an Israeli-Syrian dialogue; and thirdly, I would favor unconditional bilateral talks with Iran. 

MR. NASR: I would say that a war that has changed the region -- and we all attest to that. Everybody in the region would say that this war has changed everything: the perception of one another, the calculus. How could that war be resolved without that region having to buy in? I mean, we almost want to recreate Iraqand put the Humpty Dumpty back without having anybody buying. And we, I think, we -- our focus has not been on a final solution that the region, all of Iraq’s neighbors, would be willing to accept. We’ve constantly said, well, stability is in their interest. Yes it is, but if -- that they all agree on. Nobody wants chaos in Iraq. What they don’t agree on is, what is the final shape of Iraq? And we have had no conversation, and they have had no conversation. 

MR. ROSS: Yeah. I would echo a lot of that. I would simply add that the easiest way for us to begin an engagement would be through a regional conference on Iraq. 
 

Professor Nasr says that the President’s continued focus on a military solution, particularly in the absence of a political plan, is unlikely to achieve progress toward peace in Iraq.

MR. NASR: Part of the problem with the surge is that there is a military solution here with no political plan to back it up. It would have been possible to assuage the fears of both sides if there was a new political plan that would have shown a road map to peace with, I think, a step-by-step about how the United Statescan actually get the two sides to make the compromises rather than just putting benchmarks at it.
 

Professor Nasr does not believe that the Malikigovernment is ready to take the action necessary to achieve national reconciliation.

MR. NASR: Nothing I have seen from the Maliki government in the past several months suggests that it can act independent of its core constituency or that it’s willing to do so. I think it’s more driven by survival within that coalition and it’s more driven by the public opinion, which, unfortunately, is not right now in a conciliatory mood. And I think if we listen to, say, the statements of Maliki’spartners in his own coalition, in his government, in the Parliament, not to say the mood in the street, it’s far more sectarian and hard- line than what we hear from him.

 

Ambassador Haass believes that the Administration’s policies in Iraq have undermined stability in the Middle East, emboldened Iran, and effectively weakened U.S.influence in the region.

SEN. MENENDEZ: Ambassador Haass, let me ask you. I think I see a -- sense you want to comment on that as well. But let me ask you one thing. One -- you said in recent article, quote “One thing is certain: the American era in the Middle East is over;” end quote. And then you went on to talk about -- the Iraq war more than anything else has caused this fall. Could you expand upon that for us and what that means? 

AMBASSADOR HAASS: What concerns me now is we have put a disproportionate share of our resources, broadly defined, in Iraq, which leaves us less resources to do other things. We’ve lost the principal counter to Iran, which was Iraq, so we’ve lost the local geopolitical balance. Iran, meanwhile, is feeling --- I guess the street expression is feeling that it’s riding high thanks to relatively high energy costs, their strategic accomplishment this summer with Hezbollah, looking at the loss of the Taliban and what’s happened in Iraq. So they’re feeling strategically advantaged. And you add all this up, and it seems to me that we’re entering an era where the Untied States has less resources that are discretionary available to make things happen, that Iran has dramatically improved its position, and many of the things that the United States would want to bring about in the Middle East we’re simply unable to.” 

 

Wednesday, January 17: Senate Armed Services Committee,
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee
“Abusive Practices in Department of Defense Contracting
for Services and Inter-agency Contracting”

 

The Department of Defense (DoD) has “parked” up to $2 billion in appropriated funds at the Department of the Interior, allowing the Pentagon to maintain current funding levels, to compensate for its own contracting shortcomings, and to hire particular contractors without full competition.

“[W]e found that DoD activities used GSA and the Department of the Interior revolving funds as places to ‘park’ or ‘bank’ funds that were expiring. Subsequently, both GSA and Interior placed contracts for DoD customers using the expired funds, thereby circumventing DoD appropriations law. We determined that at GSA, about $1 billion to $2 billion in expired funds remained in the “bank” at the end of our FY 2005 audit. At the Department of the Interior, we identified about $400 million that we believed should have been returned to the Treasury as expired funds. Most of the contracting and funding problems were driven by three factors: the desire to hire a particular contractor, the desire to obligate expiring funds, and the inability of the DoDcontracting workforce to timely respond to its customers.” (Statement of Mr. Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, Department of Defense)

 

The Inspector General found that DoDcontracting officials failed to follow best practices, resulting in “severe contracting problems.”

“We found that DoD and non-DoD officials skipped basic planning and contracting fundamentals such as performing market surveys, competing acquisitions, determining price reasonableness, conducting surveillance on services received, and obtaining required approvals for construction and leasing contracts. We found some severe contracting problems.” (Statement of Mr. Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, Department of Defense)

 

DoDunnecessarily spent $23 million on fees charged by the interagency contracting office at the Department of the Interior, then failed to monitor that office’s performance.

“Of the 131 GSA purchases and 49 Department of the Interior purchases reviewed, we found only one instance where a DoD organization documented that using a non-DoD agency to award the contract was in the best interest of the Government. Program and contract officials conducted almost no market research on the other interagency purchases we reviewed. DoD used the Department of the Interior to purchase approximately $592 million of goods and services from the Federal Supply Schedules. For that service, DoDpaid the Department of the Interior more than $23 million in surcharges for purchases that could have been routinely handled by junior DoD contracting personnel.” (Statement of Mr. Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, Department of Defense)

 

Interagency contracting arrangements lacked mechanisms for contract oversight.

“Of the 131 GSA purchases reviewed, 117 did not have adequate surveillance plans that met Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements. Government surveillance was also not adequate for 23 of the 24 Department of the Interior services contracts reviewed. On almost all interagency purchases, it was unclear who had responsibility for surveillance.”(Statement of Mr. Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, Department of Defense)

 

Interagency contracting arrangements allowed DoD to avoid congressional oversight of a $100 million lease arranged for Counterintelligence Field Activity, a DoD counterintelligence program.

“The 10-year, $100 million lease for the Counterintelligence Field Activity was disguised as a service contract and exceeded all thresholds that require Congressional notification and approval. If DoD and Interior managers are allowed to purchase lease space via service contracts, congressional and senior DoD oversight will be lost, and other DoDactivities will be making ‘end runs’ around GSA and Congressional approvals. We are currently aware of two other major leases that similarly circumvented the process.” (Statement of Mr. Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, Department of Defense)

 

GAO concluded that DoD lacks sound business practices, resulting in unnecessary waste and abuse.

“The lack of sound business practices — poorly defined requirements, inadequate competition, inadequate monitoring of contractor performance, and inappropriate uses of other agencies’ contracts and contracting services — exposes DoDto unnecessary risk and wastes resources. Moreover, DoD’s current management structure to oversee service acquisition outcomes has tended to be reactive and its processes suffer from the absence of several key elements at both a strategic and transactional level.” (Statement of Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing Director, Acqusition and Sourcing Management, GAO)

 

GAO believes that DoD lacks the ability to diagnose its contracting problems, let alone to solve them.

“DoDleadership will be critical for translating this assessment into policy and, most importantly, effective frontline practices. At this point, however, DoD does not know how well its services acquisition processes are working, which part of its mission can best be met through buying services, and whether it is obtaining the services it needs while protecting DoD’s and the taxpayer’s interests.” (Statement of Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing Director, Acqusition and Sourcing Management, GAO) 

 

Thursday, January 18: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
“Securing America’s Interests in Iraq: The Remaining Options:
Military and Security Strategy”

General Barry McCaffrey (Ret.) warned of the growing crisis in Iraq; a crisis that the United States increasingly faces alone.

GEN. MCCAFFREY: “[T[he situation in Iraq is perilous and growing worse. Thousands of Iraqis are killed each month; hundreds of thousands are refugees. The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is largely dysfunctional. Our allies, including the brave and competent British are nearly gone.”

 

According to General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Ret.), the President’s surge strategy is unlikely to succeed.

GEN. HOAR: “The addition of 20,000 troops is too little too late. This is still not enough to quell the violence and without major changes in the command and control of forces within Baghdad, the current set-up of shared control is unsatisfactory.”

 

Lt. General William E. Odom (Ret.), former director of the National Security Agency, believes the President’s new strategy in Iraqis flawed, and could further escalate the conflict.

LT. GEN. ODOM: It is strategic error of monumental proportions to view the war as confined to Iraq. Yet this is the implicit assumption on which the president’s new strategy is based. We have turned it into two wars that vastly exceed the borders of Iraq. First, there is the war against the U.S. occupation that draws both sympathy and material support from other Arab countries. Second, there is the Shiite-Sunni war, a sectarian conflict heretofore sublimated within the Arab world but that now has opened the door to Iranian influence in Iraq. In turn, it foreordains an expanding Iranian-Arab regional conflict. Any military proposals today that do not account for both larger wars, as well as the Iranian threat to the Arab states on the Persian Gulf, must be judged as wholly inadequate if not counterproductive.” 

 

Thursday, January 18: Senate Judiciary Committee
“Oversight of the U.S.Department of Justice”

 

Attorney General Gonzales failed to answer how many U.S. Attorneys have been asked to resign, or why, but pledged to seek Senate confirmation of all replacements

FEINSTEIN: Now, let me get at where I’m going. How many United States attorneys have been asked to resign in the past year? 

GONZALES: Senator, you know, you’re asking me to get into a public discussion about personnel... 

FEINSTEIN: No, I’m just asking you to give me a number. That’s all. I’m asking you to give me a number. I’m asking... 

GONZALES: You know, I don’t know the answer to that question. But we have been very forthcoming... 

FEINSTEIN: You didn’t know it on Tuesday when I spoke with you. saidyou would find out and tell me. 

GONZALES: I’m not sure I said that, but... 

FEINSTEIN: Yes, you did, Mr. Attorney General. 

GONZALES: Well, if that’s what I said, then that’s what I will do. But we did provide to you a letter where we gave you a lot of information about... 

FEINSTEIN: I read the letter. 

GONZALES: OK. 

FEINSTEIN: It doesn’t answer the questions that I have. I know of at least six that have been asked to resign. I know that we amended the law in the Patriot Act and we amended it because if there were a national security problem, the attorney general would have the ability to move into the gap. We did not amend it to prevent the confirmation process from taking place. And I’m very concerned. I’ve had two of them asked to resign in my state from major jurisdictions with major cases ongoing, with substantially good records as prosecutors. And I’m very concerned, because, technically, under the Patriot Act, you can appoint someone without confirmation for the remainder of the president’s term. I don’t believe you should do that. We are going to try to change the law back.

GONZALES: Senator, may I just say that I don’t think there was any evidence that is what I’m trying to do. In fact, to the contrary, the evidence is quite clear that what we’re trying to do is ensure that for the people in each of these respective districts we have the very best possible representative for the Department of Justice and that we are working to nominate people and that we are working with home state senators to get U.S. attorneys nominated. So the evidence is just quite contrary to what your possibly suggesting. Let me just say... 

FEINSTEIN: Do you deny that you have asked -- your office has asked United States Attorneys to resign in the past year? 

GONZALES: Senator, that... 

FEINSTEIN: Yes or no? 

GONZALES: Yes. No, I don’t deny that. What I’m saying is -- but that happens during every administration during different periods for different reasons. And so the fact that that’s happened, quite frankly, some people should view that as a sign of good management. What we do is we make an evaluation about the performance of individuals, and I have a responsibility to the people in your district that we have the best possible people in these positions. And that’s the reason why changes sometimes have to be made, although there are a number of reasons why changes get made and why people leave on their own. I think I would never, ever make a change in a United States Attorney for political reasons or if it would in any way jeopardize an ongoing serious investigation. I just would not do it. 

FEINSTEIN: Well, let me just say one thing. I believe very strongly that these positions should come to this committee for confirmation. 

GONZALES: They are, Senator. 

FEINSTEIN: I believe very strongly we should have the opportunity... 

GONZALES: I agree with you. 

FEINSTEIN: ... to answer questions about...

GONZALES: I agree with you.

FEINSTEIN: And I have been asked by another senator to ask this question, and I will: Was there any other reason for asking Bud Cummings of Arkansas to resign other than the desire to put in Tim Griffin? 

GONZALES: Senator, again, I’m not going to get into a public discussion about the merits or not with respect to personnel decisions.
 

Attorney General Gonzales claimed that the Constitution does not provide an express habeas corpusright.

SPECTER: If I may, Mr. Chairman. I may go a little over time, which I don’t like to do. But let me take up this habeas corpus issue very briefly. Where you have the Constitution having an explicit provision, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except for rebellion or invasion. And you have the Supreme Court saying that habeas corpus rights apply to Guantanamodetainees, aliens in Guantanamo, after an elaborate discussion as to why. How can there be a statutory taking of habeas corpus when there’s an expressed constitutional provision that it can’t be suspended and an explicit Supreme Court holding that it applies to Guantanamo alien detainees? 

GONZALES: A couple of things, Senator. I believe that the Supreme Court case you’re referring to dealt only with the statutory right to habeas, not the constitutional right to habeas. 

SPECTER: Well, you’re not right about that. It’s plain on its face they’re talking about the constitutional right to habeas corpus. They talk about habeas corpus being guaranteed by the Constitution except in cases of an invasion or rebellion. They talk about John at Runnymedeand the Magna Carta and the doctrine being embedded in the Constitution. 

GONZALES: Sir, the fact that they may have talked about the constitutional right to habeas doesn’t mean that the decision dealt with the constitutional right to habeas. 

SPECTER: When did you last read the case?
GONZALES: It has been a while. But I’d happy to go -- I will go back and look at it…I will go back and look at it. The fact that the Constitution -- again, there is no expressed grant of habeas in the Constitution. There’s a prohibition against taking it away. But it’s never been the case. I’m not aware of a Supreme... 

SPECTER: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. The Constitution says you can’t take it away except in case of rebellion or invasion. Doesn’t that mean you have the right of habeas corpus unless there’s an invasion or rebellion? 

GONZALES: I meant by that comment, the Constitution doesn’t say every individual in the United Statesor every citizen is hereby granted or assured the right to habeas. Doesn’t say that. It simply says the right of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except... 

SPECTER: You may be treading on your interdiction and violating common sense, Mr. Attorney General.
 

Attorney General Gonzales declined to say whether the Administration would object to the FISA court voluntarily sending copies of its decision to the Judiciary Committee.

LEAHY: But before I turn it over to Senator Specter, let me mention that Senator Specter and I joined together in asking the chief judge in the FISA court for copies of the decision of that court that you announced publicly on Wednesday. The court’s apparently willing to provide these decisions to the committee. You have no objection for that, do you? 

GONZALES: Senator, I think that’s a decision that would like to take back to my principal, quite frankly. 

… 

LEAHY: I don’t think I fully understand that. Are you saying that you might object to the court giving us decisions that you’ve publicly announced? Are we a little Alicein Wonderland here? 

GONZALES: I’m not saying that I have objections to it being released. What I’m saying is it’s not my decision to make.

 

Attorney General Gonzales refused to explain why the Administration needed three years to seek FISA approval for its warrantless wiretapping program, or whether the Administration will act outside FISA in the future.

SCHUMER:…The previous program has been going on for five years. That’s longer than it took us to fight World War II. Your negotiations, by your own admission, have gone on two years. That’s longer than this administration took to conceive a plan to invade Iraq, mobilize the troops, invade Iraqand topple Saddam Hussein. Can you give us some documentation, whether it’s in camera or publicly, about why the negotiations took so long, what the change in heart was in the administration? 

GONZALES: I think, as we have these additional briefings and there’s a better understanding of how the application is structure and how the orders work, I think people will have a better understanding of why it took so long to get this done. 

SCHUMER: A fundamental question a lot of people are asking, sir -- and that is, if FISA was always sufficient to facilitate this program, why didn’t you use it in the first place? 

GONZALES: Sir, we didn’t know that FISA was sufficient until the very moment that the judge approved the order. As I’ve said several times... 

SCHUMER: It took five years for that to happen? 

GONZALES: As I’ve said several times, we started down this road -- the administration started down this road just months after the attacks of September 11 because we did not believe that FISA was available to allow the United States to engage in this kind of foreign collection in a manner that would protect the national security of our country. 

SCHUMER: Let me ask you a question. Did you negotiate with the FISA judges or did you just propose something at once; they looked at it and came back to you? Or was there a lot of give and take and back and forth? 

GONZALES: I’m not going to get a discussion about our interaction with the court on this order, as I wouldn’t on any other order. 

SCHUMER: Well, let me just say this, because again, you’ve received some plaudits here. And I’m glad -- as I said, this is better than what we had. But I, for one, can’t feel very relieved knowing that the administration’s view is they can go back and reinstitute the old program on a whim... 

GONZALES: Senator... 

SCHUMER: ...that we don’t know what type of warrants are being approved by the FISA court -- is it two? Is it 10? Is it 20? -- and whether it’s individual. And third, we don’t know what brought this all about: how long the negotiations took, the way it came about, et cetera. Remember, the FISA court’s a secret court. The FISA court has no Supreme Court review. Now, that’s not your doing. That’s established by statute. But that seems to me, if there were a new spirit of cooperation and understanding of the checks and balances and balances of power, that, sir, you’d be more forthcoming, to try and show the American people that this is a real change. 

 

Thursday, January 18: Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee
“An Oversight Hearing on Oil and Gas Royalty Management”

The Mineral Management Service (MMS) said lost revenues due to a lack of price thresholds in 1998 and 1999 leases could exceed $10 billion.

GAO found that about $1 billion had already been lost. (Testimony of Assistant Secretary Stephen Allred and GAO) 
 

The Inspector General at the Department of the Interior called MMS’sresponse “a shockingly cavalier management approach” to a very serious problem.

“Mr. Chairman, this, at a minimum was a shockingly cavalier management approach to an issue with such profound financial ramifications, a jaw-dropping example of bureaucratic bungling, and a reliance on a surname-process which dilutes responsibility and accountability. Although we found massive finger-pointing and blame enough to go around, we do not have a ‘smoking gun’ or any evidence that this omissions was deliberate; we do, however, have a very costly mistake which might never have been aired publicly absent the New York Times, the interest of this Committee, the House Subcommittee on Energy and Resources and that of several other interested members of Congress.” (Testimony of Earl Devaney, Inspector General, Department of the Interior) 
 

GAO found that royalty relief will likely cost the government billions.

“While precise estimates remain elusive at this time, our work to date shows that royalty relief under the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995 will likely cost billions of dollars in forgone royalty revenue—at least $1 billion of which has already been lost. In October 2004, MMS estimated that forgone royalties on deep water leases issued under the act from 1996 through 2000 could be as high as $80 billion.” (Testimony of Mark Gaffigan, GAO)

DPC

CONTACTS

DPC

  • Neil Higgins (224-3232)

SHARE

Link to this report

Click on field; right-click and copy; paste into your page

E-mail this Report

Your E-mail Message


Democratic Policy Committee
419 Hart Senate Office Building Wash. D.C. 20510 (202-224-3232)