DPC | February 5, 2007

Senate Oversight Highlights Week of January 29, 2007

“It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents…” — Woodrow Wilson

Congress has the Constitutional responsibility to perform oversight of the Executive Branch and matters of public interest. This report summarizes highlights from each week’s Senate oversight hearings.

 

Monday, January 29, 2007: Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

“A Field Hearing on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Outstanding Need, Slow Progress”

• Walter Leger, Chairman of the Housing and Redevelopment Task Force, Louisiana Recovery Authority, denounced the slow pace of the recovery effort.
   
• Mayor Nagin warned that citizens are losing hope.
   
• Seventeen months after Hurricane Katrina hit, New Orleans still faces monumental challenges in its road to recovery. 

 

Tuesday, January 30, 2007: Senate Armed Services Committee

“Hearing on the Nomination of Admiral William Fallon to be Commander, U.S. Central Command”

• Senator McCain faulted the Bush Administration’s past mistakes and lack of candor with regard to the current situation in Iraq. 
   
• Admiral Fallon testified that the war in Iraq cannot be won by military means alone. 
   
• Admiral Fallon cited insufficient regional diplomacy in the Middle East.
   
• Senator Warner expressed the desire to lower the numbers of American troops in Baghdad and skepticism about President Bush’s proposed “surge.”

 

Tuesday, January 30, 2007: Senate Foreign Relations Committee

“Securing America’s Interests in Iraq: The Remaining Options: Alternative Plans: The Iraq Study Group”

• Lee Hamilton warned that the Bush Administration’s policy of isolating Syria and Iran is not working, and is actually undermining U.S. interests. 
   
• Secretary James Baker warned that the Administration is passing up a critical opportunity by refusing to talk to Syria — an opportunity to prevent that country from aligning with Iran and a chance to gain cooperation in Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iraq.
   
• Lee Hamilton is not confident in the President’s troop surge plan, largely because several surges have already failed.

 

Tuesday, January 30, 2007: Senate Foreign Relations Committee

“Nomination Hearing of The Honorable John D. Negroponte to be Deputy Secretary of State”

• Ambassador Negroponte believes that Iran has become emboldened since the start of the Iraq war, and warned that both Iran and Syria are playing destabilizing roles in Iraq. 
   
• Ambassador Negroponte does not believe that we have the diplomatic infrastructure in place necessary to address the challenges we face in the world today.
   
• Republican members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voiced their support for increased diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, a key recommendation of the Iraq Study Group.

 

Tuesday, January 30, 2007: Senate Judiciary Committee

“Exercising Congress’s Constitutional Power to End a War”

·The Senate Judiciary Committee asked some of the nation’s top constitutional law scholars whether Congress has the Constitutional authority to end a war. 

·Four out of five witnesses answered that Congress has the duty to reassess war and the Article I power to end it. 

·Senators and witnesses alike disagreed strongly with the notion that Congressional and public debate on the war hurts troop morale.

 

Tuesday, January 30, 2007: Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

“Wildfire Cost-Containment”

• Senators and the witnesses agreed that escalating wildfire management costs poses a significant challenge that must be addressed.
   
• A number of witnesses also pointed to shortcomings in the Federal land management agencies’ fuels reduction (forest thinning) programs.

 

Tuesday, January 31, 2007, Senate Special Committee on Aging

“Medicare Part D: Is It Working for Low Income Seniors?”

• CMS administration of Part D has been inefficient and, at times, misleading.
   
• Over half of Part D beneficiaries eligible for a low-income subsidy are not receiving the subsidy. 
   
• The asset test for the low-income subsidy should be eliminated.
   
• The lack of data sharing between Medicare, Social Security, and prescription drug plans leads to erroneous drug charges to low-income beneficiaries.

 

Wednesday, January 31, 2007: Senate Armed Services Committee, Readiness and Management Subcommittee

“Abusive Practices in Department of Defense Contracting for Services and Interagency Contracting”

• Non-competitive contracts are becoming more common, and no data exists on the competitiveness of contracts awarded on an interagency basis. 
   
• Large contracts are passing through the interagency contracting process with no oversight.
   
• Departments and agencies need to improve their data on the competitiveness of their contracts.

 

Wednesday, January 31, 2007: Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing

“Examining Recommendations for Improvements to Iraq’s Justice System”

• The Senate Judiciary Committee invited two members of the Iraq Study Group to identify problems with Iraq’s Criminal Justice System and make recommendations for solving them. 
   
• The Co-Chair of the Iraq Study Group detailed the lack of training, overburdening, and corruption that has crippled Iraq’s justice system. 
   
• The Iraq Study Group recommended that the Department of Justice and other agencies increase their training role to help Iraqis improve their police force and justice system.

 

Thursday, February 1, 2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

“Confirmation Hearing on Nomination of J. Michael McConnell to be Director of National Intelligence”

• The Chairman and Ranking Member agreed that the Intelligence Community must be more forthcoming in providing Congress with intelligence information. 
   
• Mr. McConnell testified that the Intelligence Community needs to be more integrated and collaborative. 
   
• Mr. McConnell testified that private contractors should not be used for sensitive intelligence tasks like interrogation.
   
• Mr. McConnell acknowledged that the Intelligence currently provided to our troops in Iraq is inadequate. 

Thursday, February 1, 2007: Senate Armed Services Committee

“The Nomination of General George W. Casey, Jr., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Army”

• The Iraqis did not ask for, and the Iraqi Prime Minister did not want, more American troops. 
   
• General Casey disagrees with the President that we have a failed strategy, and instead sees the escalation as an “enhancement” of current strategy. 
   
• General Casey was unaware of a report by the Pentagon’s inspector general that found even current troops lack necessary armor and equipment.
   
• President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld did not follow the advice of and requests from their commanders when informed that “clear, hold, build” was not working. 
   

Senators Lieberman, Landrieu and Obama convened a hearing in New Orleans to highlight the lack of progress in the recovery effort, identify ways to improve the rebuilding initiatives along the Gulf Coast, and better prepare for future disasters.

SENATOR LIEBERMAN: New Orleans and the Gulf Coast are an important part of the commerce and culture, the past, present and future of America …That is why we have come here today. A year and a half after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it’s time to redouble our efforts to win the new Battle for New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. Congress has provided over $110 billion dollars to the region since Katrina and Rita…Yet for all of the funding Congress approved, the reality seems to be that the money is not arriving fast enough or is sitting idle while the people of New Orleans and the Gulf states continue to suffer and struggle. 

SENATOR LANDRIEU: Today’s hearing exposed how Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the levee breaks that followed stretched our national disaster response structures to their limit, exposing many weaknesses in nearly every agency involved. Over the coming months, the Disaster Response Subcommittee I chair will examine each of these cracks in the strategy in more detail and will develop common sense solutions to improving the recovery along the Gulf Coast and better prepare our nation for future disasters 

SENATOR OBAMA: What I don’t know and what I hope to find out today, is whether we in the federal government are doing our part to help the people of New Orleans rebuild… I hope we get some answers today, because rebuilding the city of New Orleans is not just for the good of the Gulf Coast, or the State of Louisiana, it is for the good of our nation.
 

Walter Leger, Chairman of the Housing and Redevelopment Task Force, Louisiana Recovery Authority, denounced the slow pace of the recovery effort.

MR. LEGER: Our South Louisiana communities are still suffering greatly – more than they should be this long after a disaster. In many ways recovery has yet to be felt in our neighborhoods, and in our homes. My neighborhood in St. Bernard Parish is a perfect example – most homes are still vacant and heavily damaged, roads, water and sewer are in disrepair, most businesses have yet to return. The simple truth is that recovery is not happening quickly enough. Things need to change.

 

Mayor Nagin warned that citizens are losing hope.

MAYOR NAGIN: Although I have outlined some of the steps we have taken to replace city services and discussed my administration’s commitment to speeding up our own recovery with whatever funding we can find, the reality is that it has been 17 months since Katrina, Rita and the flooding that followed and citizens are tired, frustrated and angry. Worst of all they are losing hope. We need systemic, meaningful change now.

 

Mr. Ledger testified that current federal relief programs were not created to address, and are not are not capable of addressing catastrophic disaster.

MR. LEGER: Unfortunately, the State of Louisiana is suffering under Federal relief programs that were never designed to address the needs of a catastrophic disaster. We are being limited by red tape, inflexibility, and bureaucratic inertia. We are struggling against people and programs that are no prepared to meet the timelines and requirements of communities in crisis. And we are being forced to fight for equal treatment and fairness in the distribution of disaster relief. These are all areas where Congress and the Administration in Washington, DC can help significantly.

 

Seventeen months after Hurricane Katrina hit, New Orleans still faces monumental challenges in its road to recovery.

• Hundreds of thousands of Louisiana residents are still unable to return to their homes.

MR. LEGER: More than 1.3 million people [in Louisiana] were evacuated during the period after the storms, and to date, approximately a quarter-million are still unable to return to their homes due to disaster damages. 

• Southern Louisiana does not have enough skilled workers to lead the rebuilding effort.

MS. MESTAYER: Katrina has also created a dyer need to replenish the region’s workforce to help rebuild. There are not nearly enough skilled workers to fill the needs employers have to rebuild or locate in the region. 

• Mental health services devastated by Katrina have yet to be restored.

MAYOR NAGIN: The provision of mental health services poses a particular challenge in a region that has seen such loss, death and destruction. The city has observed higher levels of stress and depression, which is understandable in light of obstacles our residents face in reestablishing their lives in a changed environment. The city has fewer than 50 hospital beds for inpatient psychiatric care – 17 percent of pre Katrina capacity. We estimate that 20 of the 200 psychiatrists who were here before the storm have returned to continue their practices. 

Senator McCain faulted the Bush Administration’s past mistakes and lack of candor with regard to the current situation in Iraq.

SEN. MCCAIN: This war has been mishandled. No one doubts that mistakes have been made in Iraq, and no one disagrees that the consequences of a failed state there are potentially catastrophic. I have to tell you, this committee did not get candid assessments in the past, and I view that with deep regret because I think the American people and their representatives deserved better…. Too often, administration officials came before this committee and the American people and painted a rosy scenario when it was not there. This is probably our last opportunity, this change in strategy, to salvage a very difficult situation. I hope you know and will tell this committee how difficult and arduous this task will be because of the hole that we’ve dug for ourselves to a very large degree.

 

Admiral Fallon asserted that our current strategy in Iraq has not worked.

SEN. LEVIN: Our troops are going to be inserted into the most difficult areas imaginable, right into the neighborhoods, right in the face of the Iraqis. How are we going to avoid the inherent risks that are created, the increased risks that are created by that kind of face-to-face presence? 

ADM. FALLON: But it seems pretty obvious to me that what we have been doing has not been working. We have not been getting the results that we desire, and we clearly have to do something different. There is a significant body of evidence that indicates that approaching an insurgency, such as we are facing now… to be successful in this endeavor, historically you’ve had to get in amongst the population to convince them that you really care about them and that you are able to provide security on-scene rather than just passing through an area.

 

Admiral Fallon testified that the war in Iraq is not winnable by military means alone.

SEN. GRAHAM: Is Iraq winnable militarily? 

ADM. FALLON: Not militarily. But could the situation in Iraq be turned around? I firmly believe it can, if we have the engagement of the capabilities that are necessary to help. 

SEN. GRAHAM: I agree. We’re not seeking a military victory in Iraq; we’re trying to turn around the situation in terms of security.

 

Admiral Fallon cited insufficient regional diplomacy in the Middle East.

ADM. FALLON: In addressing these and other challenges in the region, I would, if confirmed, solicit the opinions and suggestions of our allies and partners in the region and the world. There is no doubt that other nations in the region could be helpful with the situation in Iraq…. There’s a lot that isn’t being done. In fact, I see an awful lot of sitting watching by the neighborhood. And it’s high time that that changed. So I would be very anxious to try to engage, and intend to engage with our Department of State, Secretary Rice and her folks, to have a full understanding of this, and then maybe we can figure out collectively how to proceed.

 

Admiral Fallon urged tempered expectations about prospects in Iraq.

SEN. GRAHAM: Okay. Could you envision a democracy emerging in Iraq with this level of violence at the current state? 

ADM. FALLON: I think that we would probably be wise to temper our expectations here, that the likelihood that Iraq is suddenly going to turn into something that looks close to what we enjoy here in this country is going to be a long time coming.

 

Senator Warner voiced concern about placing our troops in the middle of sectarian violence:

SEN. WARNER: My concern rests with the American GIs being injected into these situations which go back, as we say, 1,400 years in disagreements. I have no disrespect for the Muslim religion, but it is hard to understand and follow and how today Muslim is falling upon Muslim in the animosity and the bitterness that leads to the killing and the instability.

 

Senator Warner expressed the desire to lower the numbers of American troops in Baghdad and skepticism about President Bush’s proposed “surge.”

SEN. WARNER: You will work with your commanders to get the violence down, but hopefully to do it in such a way that more and more of the Iraqis take the lead. That’s a phrase we haven’t heard in this debate -- “take the lead,” which means getting out there in front. They understand the language, they understand the culture. And our youngsters are doing the best to support them to take that lead. And to that extent, I hope we can lower the levels of Americans involved directly in that Baghdad situation. There are 6 to 7 million people, and there’s only so much a military force of an additional 20,000 -- if we have to put the whole complement in there -- can do together with the Iraqis, unless the Iraqis step up and continue to augment their participation. 

Lee Hamilton warned that the Bush Administration’s policy of isolating Syria and Iran is not working, and is actually undermining U.S. interests.

HAMILTON: Iran has become the most powerful country in the region. It continues to support terrorist organizations. It’s continuing to develop its nuclear potential. How can anyone say today that our policy towards Iran is working? It is not. Likewise, Syria. Syria has certainly been a negative force in Iraq. It continues to support terrorist organizations in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. But our policy of isolation is not working. We don’t have a lot to lose, frankly, by engaging these countries. Now, Jim and I are not starry-eyed about this. We don’t think you sit down with these folks and immediately come to solutions. There isn’t any country on the face of the earth that has caused us more heartburn over the last several decades than Iran has. So these solutions are going to come hard. We do not view talking as appeasement and the argument that you mentioned a moment ago is that we enhance their influence when we sit down with them.
 

Secretary Baker warned that the Administration is passing up a critical opportunity by refusing to talk to Syria — an opportunity to prevent that country from aligning with Iran and a chance to gain cooperation in Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iraq.

BAKER: Where I think we’re missing the boat, if I might jump ahead a little bit and I know Lee probably has a comment on this, too, where I think we’re really missing the boat is Syria. I think we have tremendous opportunity here to perhaps move them away from a marriage of convenience with Iran… I think there’s a real opportunity there to move them away from Iran without giving up anything. …if we were able to flip Syria away from Iran and back toward where I think they would like to be, based on a 2.5 to 3-hour discussion I had, with the president’s approval, with the Syrian foreign minister, I think they’re ready to come back. And what could we do? We could get them to get Hamas, which is headquartered in Damascus, to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Boy, would that be a step in the right direction. You give Israel a negotiating partner on the Palestinian tract. I think we could cut off the flow of arms to Hezbollah, because Syria is the transit point for all of those. And we’re not suggesting you give up anything. Certainly, you hold their feet to the fire on the investigations going on with the assassinations in Lebanon. You get them to stop screwing around in Lebanon to the degree and extent that they have been. You get them to do a better job of closing their borders.

 

Secretary Baker highlighted the importance of reaching out to Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran, in our efforts to stabilize Iraq and encourage political reconciliation.

BAKER: And with respect to Iran generally, may I just say that the recommendation in our report regarding talking to Iran is really a recommendation about talking to them in the context of the formation of an international Iraq support group. That is, a group of nations, a coalition, if you will, that would help us with some of the difficulties we have in Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors.

 

Lee Hamilton does not believe that the Bush Administration is acting with the urgency necessary to address the situation in Iraq.

MENENDEZ: With all due respect, do you sense that this administration has captured that same sense of urgency on these other matters?

 

HAMILTON: No, I do not. I think that, for example, on the conditionality question, the president’s approach has been, “I must try to give Mr. Maliki confidence,” and he has been unwilling to be critical of Mr. Maliki. Now, that may be the approach by which you would begin. I think you’re at a point now where you have to bear down on the Maliki government because of their nonperformance over a period of time. And if they don’t perform and if they don’t perform pretty quickly, then we will lose it, I don’t care how many troops you put in there, you’re going to lose it. They must begin to perform and they must begin to perform promptly.

 

Lee Hamilton is not confident in the President’s troop surge plan, largely because several surges have already failed.

HAMILTON: You’re correct, I mean, the surge is not a new idea. We’ve had several surges there and what has been very clear is that the Iraqi forces have not performed. They didn’t show up on some occasions or they showed up much fewer in strength than we had anticipated. Now, the argument is made that things have changed, that they’re ready to go. I hope that’s the case, but we certainly haven’t seen solid evidence of that up to this point. 

Ambassador Negroponte believes that Iran has become emboldened since the start of the Iraq war, and warned that both Iran and Syria are playing destabilizing roles in Iraq.

NEGROPONTE: I think that Iran has -- its behavior has been emboldened in the past couple of years. I think back in 2003, their behavior was not as bold as it has been recently. In terms of their assertiveness in Iraq, where I mentioned earlier, they’ve been providing these lethal equipment to Shia extremists. In Lebanon, in the Palestinian territories, I think that, just generally speaking, Iran has played a more assertive role than it did previously. I think Syria also has not played a constructive role. The situation in Lebanon, the assassination of President Hariri -- we still haven’t gotten to the bottom of that, but there are concerns in that regard -- and their failure to take adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign fighters across their border and into Iraq.

 

Despite his assertion that Iran and Syria are undermining U.S. efforts in Iraq, Ambassador Negroponte opposes diplomatic engagement.

BIDEN: My specific question is do you believe that at your level, the level of the secretary of state, do you think there should be an initiation of discussions with Syria and with Iran relating to Iraq? Not whether they can come to us: Should we initiate discussions? 

NEGROPONTE: I think the view at this time, Mr. Chairman, is that they know what they need to do. I would never want to say never with respect to initiating a high-level dialogue with either of these two countries, but that’s the position, as I understand it, at this time.

 

Ambassador Negroponte does not believe that we have the diplomatic infrastructure in place necessary to address the challenges we face in the world today.

CORKER: …there tends to be a concern about just our country’s readiness, if you will, to deal with the world as it is today -- the State Department, Department of Defense, intelligence…How do you assess our readiness in general? 

NEGROPONTE: If you asked me the question of is our diplomatic establishment as well-prepared as it can be for the greater variety of problems that we have to deal with in this world, when you think about the fact that we no longer face just one monolithic threat, if you will, as we did during the Cold War, but we face a wide range and diversity of problems on this planet, I think there’s still a lot of work to be done.

 

Republican members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voiced their support for increased diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, a key recommendation of the Iraq Study Group.

HAGEL: One of [the Iraq Study Group’s] most important recommendations, at least in my mind, was their focus on a regional diplomatic strategy on Iraq that includes engagement with Iran and Syria. Now, judging from your testimony and what your life has been about, the Baker-Hamilton commission focused on diplomatic engagement. And I think most of us have some general agreement that the future of Iraq will be determined by some diplomatic framework, some political accommodation resulting in a political resolution. It won’t be decided by the military. Nothing ever is. Now, we heard what you said in response to direct questions about Iran and Syria. And I first would ask you, do you agree with the Baker-Hamilton commission report that, again, there must be a regional diplomatic strategy and focus on Iraq that includes engagement with Iran and Syria -- without going into the specifics? But would you agree with that general concept? 

VOINOVICH: The question I have is should we be convening a group of the people -- and you’ve mentioned Saudis, the Syrians -- the Syrians, not necessarily; but the Egyptians and the Jordanians -- to come together and basically say to them, “If we ultimately move out of here and this place blows up, it’s going to have a very detrimental impact on the region, and you ought to be interested in helping us stabilize the area or stabilize Iraq”? The question I have is why haven’t we done that, or, in the alternative, why hasn’t Maliki reached out to these people and called them together, and said, “Hey, guys, things are pretty bad here. Some of you are meddling in this situation. If this thing blows up, what impact is it going to have in terms of refugees? Saudis, if Sunnis started to be massacred, you’re going to be probably asked to get involved in this, and we could have a real blow-up”? Where are we with this? And why aren’t we moving in that direction right now? Or, at least, why isn’t Maliki moving in that direction? 

The Senate Judiciary Committee asked some of the nation’s top constitutional law scholars whether Congress has the Constitutional authority to end a war.

FEINGOLD: Our Founders wisely kept the power to fund a war separate from the power to conduct a war. In their brilliant design of our system of Government, Congress got the power of the purse and the President got the power of the sword…[O]ur witnesses today…are legal scholars, not military or foreign policy experts. We are here today to find out from them not what Congress should do, but what Congress can do.”

 

Four out of five witnesses answered that Congress has the duty to reassess war and the Article I power to end it.

• PROFESSOR DAVID BARRON, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL:I think the question admits of really just one answer, which is that Congress does possess the power that the question asks as to whether it possesses…The legal question that arises . . . is that when a war continues for some time, undoubtedly circumstances may change, and that may lead people to reassess the authority once willingly given and to reassess the utility of continuing with the same kind of authorization that was earlier granted gladly. When that happens, the question is: Can Congress do anything in response to that change and the reassessment that is occurring within the country? Or is it to stand by as a spectator, not by choice but by operation of the constitutional plan itself? From that perspective, looked at that way, given all we know about the Framers’ concern about unchecked power, given all we know about their desire for Congress to have a role in the authorization of such a massive use of force at the beginning, I think to ask whether the constitutional plan permits the Congress, in consideration of the changes that have occurred, to decide to act upon that reassessment admits of only one answer. How could it be that our constitutional plan would not give Congress that power?
   
• LOUIS FISHER, SPECIALIST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: “Now, when you passed the Iraq resolution in October 2002, you did not sign off and say the rest is for the President. Any statute that you pass, you have a duty to revisit it and recalibrate in light of new information. That is just the duty of the legislative branch. . . . The question to me, always remember, Congress, is [whether] the continued use of military force and a military commitment [is] in the Nation’s interest. That is the core question. Once you decide that, if you decide it is not in the national interest, you certainly do not want to continue putting U.S. troops in harm’s way.”
   
• BRADFORD BERENSON, PARTNER, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP:I think the constitutional scheme does give Congress broad authority to terminate a war. . . . [T]he question of where in the world our troops may fight and who should be treated as an enemy of the United States and just how many of our national resources should be dedicated to that kind of a conflict I think is a proper subject for congressional regulation.
   
• PROFESSOR WALTER DELLINGER, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW:[I]t is ultimately Congress that decides the size, scope, and duration of the use of military force, and this has been recognized by administrations of both political parties throughout our time…if it is true, as I think it is, that the Constitution gives this fundamental choice to the Congress of the United States [“to determine where to go to war and how to go to war and how long to go to war”], then it is appropriate to ask what justification would a President have for using forces in circumstances where it is known that the Congress elected by the people is opposed to that use of force.

 

Senator Specter challenged President Bush’s ideological and expansive approach to executive authority and blamed him in part for the recent conflicts between the branches.

SPECTER: We have an atmosphere, regrettably, of considerable suspicion with what the executive branch is doing to expand executive authority, really an ideological approach. And there are key figures in the administration who make no bones about it, very direct and very blunt, when they seek signing statements to contravene what is in the legislation the President has signed, where you have the Terrorist Surveillance Program or where you have the acts in Guantanamo that has to be struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States. And that has set the stage for, if not an atmosphere of distrust, an atmosphere of confrontation…The President repeatedly makes reference to the fact that he is the decider. I would suggest respectfully to the President that he is not the sole decider, that the decider is a shared and joint responsibility, and that when we talk about the authority of the Congress on the power of the purse and the authority under Article I to maintain armies, we are talking about authority which ought to be recognized.

 

Senators and witnesses alike disagreed strongly with the notion that Congressional and public debate on the war hurts troop morale.

SEN. SPECTER: There have been some interesting polls taken as to how the military personnel feel about the war…a poll done by the Military Times showed that only 35 percent of the military members polled this year approved of the way President Bush is handling the war, while 42 percent disapproved. Forty-one percent of the military said the U.S. should have gone to war in Iraq, down from 65 percent in 2003. That raises a question in my mind as to whether the military does not approve of questions being raised by Congress and a recognition that there are open questions here which have to be decided in a democracy. 

DELLINGER: The debate is essential in that once we are engaged in hostilities, I think it is generally accepted that Congress has the authority to limit or end those hostilities. That means there has to be a discussion about whether to do that. And if you could not have that discussion, it would be a system set up for a perpetual war, because you could never discuss whether and how to end it. And I would think that those who serve are entitled to expect that there is a continuing assessment of whether their service in that theater of war is indeed vital to the national interest. They would hope and expect that that assessment would go on and would not be cut off simply when the war had started. 

Certain beneficiaries eligible for the Medicare Part D low-income subsidy must submit an application in order to receive It.

“Three groups of beneficiaries are automatically eligible for LIS, meaning they do not have to fill out any sort of application to receive the subsidy: 

·Beneficiaries who are eligible for and enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid due to their income level—the “dual-eligibles” referred to earlier. 

·Beneficiaries enrolled in the Medicare Savings Program. These are the Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs), Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMBs), and Qualifying Individuals (QIs). 

·Beneficiaries receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), but not Medicaid. 

Beneficiaries not falling into one of these categories must apply for the LIS. This means they must submit an application to their state Medicaid agency or SSA, which is responsible for verifying income and assets to determine eligibility.” (Testimony of S. Lawrence Kocot, Senior Advisor to Administrator, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services)

  

CMS is involved in a continuous effort to find and enroll beneficiaries eligible for Medicare Part D low-income subsidies.

“Our work to identify and enroll these beneficiaries is a multi-faceted, continuous effort that did not stop with the end of the first enrollment period; rather it has been a sustained and ongoing effort. These potentially eligible LIS individuals continue to be targeted with a multi-pronged education and outreach campaign that leverages existing information intermediaries and resources.Initiatives include direct mailings and targeted telephone calls to beneficiaries, along with local outreach from community groups, intergovernmental partners, and health care providers, including pharmacists. Given that many beneficiaries may be difficult to reach through traditional means, CMS has special initiatives targeting both urban minority beneficiaries, and beneficiaries in rural areas who may be isolated from general community outreach efforts.” (Kocot Testimony)

 

The Social Security Administration is responsible for processing applications for the Medicare Part D low-income subsidy; SSA seeks to reach every Medicare beneficiary potentially eligible for the subsidy multiple times.

“SSA was given the responsibility by Congress to take “extra help” applications and to make eligibility determinations for individuals who were not automatically eligible. In order to be eligible for “extra help,” individuals must have incomes below 150 percent of the poverty level applicable to their corresponding household size…Individuals with incomes between 135 percent and 150 percent of poverty are eligible for a subsidy amount based on a sliding scale depending on their resources. Individuals with incomes below 135 percent would be eligible to receive the highest subsidies.…SSA’s goal has been to reach every potentially eligible Medicare beneficiary multiple times, in a variety of ways: for example, by targeted mailings and events, and follow-up phone calls. And while we are confident we have taken appropriate steps to reach out to those who may be eligible for the “extra help,” our outreach efforts are continuing. Because there is no enrollment period for the “extra help,” a Medicare beneficiary can apply at any time. This means there is no inappropriate time to reach out to our lower-income beneficiaries, and there is no wrong time for these individuals to complete an application.” (Testimony of Beatrice Disman, Regional Commissioner of Social Security, New York Region; Chair of the Social Security Administration Medicare Planning and Implementation Task Force) 

“As of mid January 2007, SSA has received applications from almost 6.1 million beneficiaries, of which almost 1 million were unnecessary, because either the applicants were automatically eligible or because they had filed more than one application. We have made over 5.9 million determinations on the eligibility for ‘extra help’and have now found more than 2.3 million of these individuals eligible. 

“Generally, SSA continues to receive between 30,000 – 40,000 applications for “extra help”every week – almost 600 thousand since the beginning of the fiscal year. This continued level of interest from beneficiaries – this unexpectedly high amount of applications received more than one year beyond the program’s launch – tells us our outreach campaign is working.” (Disman Testimony)

 

Over half of Part D beneficiaries eligible for a low-income subsidy are not receiving it.

“NCOA estimates that between 3.4 and 4.4 million Medicare beneficiaries eligible for the LIS [Low-Income Subsidy] are still not receiving it. We also estimate that between 35 and 42 percent of Medicare beneficiaries who needed to voluntarily file an application with SSA in 2005 and 2006 to receive LIS have successfully done so (2.2 million out of 5.2 or 6.2 million). By historical standards, this take-up rate is in line with other means-tested federal benefit programs [See Table below]. On the other hand, it also means that 58 to 65 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries who were eligible for LIS and who had to apply to get LIS are not now receiving the benefit.” (Testimony of Howard Bedlin, Vice President, Public Policy & Advocacy, National Council on Aging)

 

The asset test for the low-income subsidy discourages saving, discriminates against those who rent their homes, and thus should be eliminated.

“Eliminate the asset test because it is the single-most significant barrier to the Part D LIS for low-income seniors and people with disabilities. Of the LIS applications filed with SSA, 41 percent are denied because the person is over the asset limits…People who manage to save a modest sum for retirement and still have very limited incomes should be encouraged and rewarded, not denied the extra help that they need. Half of the people who fail the asset test have excess assets of $35,000 or less. These people tend to be older, female, widowed, and living alone. Often when the husband dies, the wife’s income is significantly reduced, but she still has the modest assets that were accumulated during the marriage. In addition, the asset test is inherently discriminatory against people who rent their homes, instead of own them.” (Bedlin Testimony) 

“Remove the barriers to applying for LIS by eliminating the asset test and by not allowing the subsidy to adversely affect any other means tested benefits such as food stamps and rental subsidies. When reductions are made in other needs-based assistance programs such as Section 8 housing, food stamps or TANF benefits, this only serves to discourage LIS enrollment. (Testimony of Ellen Leitzer, Executive Director, Health Assistance Partnership)

 

Organizations that engage in individual outreach are one of the most effective means of extending the low-income subsidy to all eligible beneficiaries.

“Appropriate funds to support organizations that use a person-centered approach to outreach, which has been shown to be one of the most efficient and effective ways to find and enroll LIS eligibles. Finding and enrolling seniors and people with disabilities with limited resources in needs-based benefits programs has been a significant challenge for many years. We know that reaching everyone in this special population will take a great deal of time and energy. We strongly recommend that additional financial resources be made available to support national organizations and local community-based organizations, so they may continue the important grassroots, one-on-one work they have been doing during the initial enrollment period.” (Bedlin Testimony)

 

State assistance programs play a vital role in assisting seniors with enrolling in and understanding Medicare benefits.

“We would like to emphasize the value of the SHIP (State Health Insurance Assistance Program) network to Medicare beneficiaries. SHIPs are the only entities that already offer one-on-one assistance with a great depth of knowledge, an objective viewpoint, and an ability to handle complex cases that may require lengthy follow-up. In addition to supporting remedies to existing LIS legislation, we urge this Committee to advocate for increased funding for the SHIP network of at least $1.00 per beneficiary in 2007 and future years.” (Leitzer Testimony)

 

The lack of data sharing between Medicare, Social Security, and prescription drug plans leads to erroneous drug charges to low-income beneficiaries.

“The system for real-time data sharing among CMS, SSA, and plans does not work properly; as a result data is being shared untimely, inefficiently, or incorrectly. This flawed system results in a lack of subsidy status and/or plan data in pharmacy computer systems. It leads to incorrect cost-sharing amounts being charged at the pharmacy. This problem is most significant for beneficiaries who also have Medicaid or Medicare Savings Programs and cannot afford standard cost-sharing amounts. In addition, if no plan enrollment is reflected in the system, CMS enrolls the dual eligible population into randomly selected plans. Thus, when data is not shared in real-time, some beneficiaries have found themselves in a different plan or in more than one plan; they are then unaware of the shift. Several SHIPs have also reported that beneficiaries with the Low-Income Subsidy enrolled in “benchmark plans” are receiving erroneous bills for premium payments, despite their full subsidy status. This is costly to taxpayers and state safety net programs, as well as the lives and wallets of vulnerable beneficiaries who leave the pharmacy counter without their medications.” (Leitzer Testimony)

 

CMS administration of Part D has been inefficient and, at times, misleading.

“CMS Regional & Central Offices require specific information about client problems one-by-one. Since the inception of Medicare Drug Coverage, myriad problems have occurred with all aspects of the program—from problems with the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder (www.medicare.gov) to beneficiaries unable to get their medications despite their best efforts and those of the SHIPs, the pharmacists, or the physicians. Throughout the first year of the program and even today, CMS insists on attempting to resolve these problems piecemeal, rather than to address them systemically.” (Leitzer Testimony) 

“CMS produces misleading media campaigns and correspondence. CMS issued an ad in Parademagazine in November 2006 that advised beneficiaries to “take no action” if they were satisfied with their plans. The ad failed to inform enrollees that the plans may have significant changes from year to year.” (Leitzer Testimony)

 

Private prescription drug plans are targeting low-income persons with inappropriately aggressive marketing tactics.

“All of the plans, particularly Medicare Advantage plans, are employing aggressive marketing tactics to all Medicare beneficiaries, especially the LIS population. Aggressive marketing tactics are not new when we think back during the summer of 2005 the Medicare Drug Gold Rush event where the brochure read, “Profit from The Biggest New Benefit in the History of Medicare – Part D Drug!!!” SHIPs all across the country are reporting new marketing tactics, particularly when it comes to Private Fee for Service (PFFS) plans. Some of these strategies include the “enroll and migrate”strategy, whereby plans first enroll beneficiaries in stand-alone PDPs, and then target these same beneficiaries later to enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan with Part D (MA-PD). The low-income subsidy population who are also dually eligible (Medicare with either Medicaid or a Medicare Savings Program) are particularly vulnerable to this tactic because of their ongoing special enrollment period.” (Leitzer Testimony) 

“SHIPs have reported to HAP other marketing strategies by brokers including uninvited soliciting of plans at beneficiaries’ doors. Also, once in residential buildings, the sales representatives find additional Medicare beneficiaries by paying home care workers for referrals; offering $200 drugstore coupons for signing up with a plan; telling beneficiaries they must choose a plan or they will lose their Medicare; enrolling beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage plans through sign-in sheets at senior centers or other venues for prizes and gifts; and downplaying formulary restrictions or making bold claims that their doctor is “in network” without such knowledge.” (Leitzer Testimony)

 

Co pays should be mitigated for low-income beneficiaries.

“Return to the original LIS co-pays of $1 & $3 for full status, and $2 & $5 for partial status until the program is operating more smoothly. Beneficiaries are left to bear the burden of paying increased co-pays for medications they may not be receiving as prescribed, or have been changed due to utilization measures.” (Leitzer Testimony) 

“Enact a monthly co-pay cap allowing some reprieve for those who take multiple medications per month. Beneficiaries, who take more than several medications per month, brand or generic, face incredible hardship when it comes to paying multiple co-pays. Enacting a monthly cap allows them to actually receive all of their medications, rather than choosing between paying their rent or food.” (Leitzer Testimony)

Non-competitive contracts are becoming more common, and no data exists on the competitiveness of contracts awarded on an interagency basis.

MARCIA MADSEN, CHAIR, ACQUISTION ADVISORY PANEL: The details are in our report, but in fiscal 2004, one-third of the government’s procurement dollars were awarded noncompetitively. And even when competed, the percent of dollars awarded when only one offer was received has more than doubled from about 9 percent in 2000 to about 20 percent in 2005. We fear that the amount of noncompetitive awards actually may be understated. Although we tried, for months, we could not obtain reliable data on competition for orders under multiple award contracts available for interagency use. We do know that, in 2004, 142 billion, or 40 percent of procurement spending went through these interagency contracts. But again, we couldn’t develop reliable data on the extent of competition.
 

Large contracts are passing through the interagency contracting process with no oversight.

MADSEN: Because of the fact that the process is set so that it’s orders under multiple award contracts, of course there is limited visibility into the ordering process that would not exist if those orders were placed as contracts under FAR Part 15. We just couldn’t get good data on the extent of competition. But we have data indicating that in 2004, $66.7 billion was expended in single transactions over $5 million, with services accounting for 64 percent, or about $42.6 billion, of that amount. So there are a number of large transactions passing through that system without oversight.

 

Departments and agencies need to improve their data on the competitiveness of their contracts.

SEN. MCCASKILL: Well, it seems to me that it’s pretty basic that we should at least know whether something’s competitive or not. I mean that, to me, is fundamental to government acquisition. And if we can’t tell whether or not what we’re buying is being done competitively, I don’t know how we think we’re ever going to get our hands around the fact that we’ve got government waste. I think it’s impossible. Correct? Am I wrong in that? 

JONATHAN ETHERTON, MEMBER, ACQUISTION ADVISORY PANEL: No. Senator McCaskill, you’re correct.

The Senate Judiciary Committee invited two members of the Iraq Study Group to identify problems with Iraq’s Criminal Justice System and make recommendations for solving them.

Senator Leahy asked Former Congressman Lee Hamilton and Former Attorney General Edwin Meese to suggest “better ways to contribute to peace and stability throughout the Iraqi neighborhoods…better ensure better police forces[,] . . . [and] better ensure that the principles of the…[law], which prohibits American financial assistance to those forces engaged in human rights violations, are honored rather than ignored.” [Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy.
 

The Co-Chair of the Iraq Study Group detailed the lack of training, overburdening, and corruption that has crippled Iraq’s justice system. 

Congressman Hamilton observed that “[t]he Iraqi police service has neither the training nor the legal authority to conduct criminal investigations. It does not have the firepower to take on organized crime, insurgents or the militias. The Iraqi police cannot control crime. They routinely engage in sectarian violence, including unnecessary detention, torture and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. Furthermore, the Iraqi national police and the Iraqi border police are charged with tasks that are not traditional policing missions. The national police operate with heavily armed commando units. They’re engaged in counterinsurgency. These units have been particularly vulnerable to infiltration by sectarian militias. The border police also have a mission that is decidedly military in nature, particularly given the importance of sealing and securing Iraq’s borders. They have to protect against arms and foreign fighters coming into Iraq. They have to work with coalition forces. Yet all of these forces -- the Iraq police service, the Iraqi national police, the Iraqi border police -- are organized under the Ministry of the Interior. The ministry is confronted by corruption and military infiltration, and lacks control over the police in the provinces…In short, we believe the problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are profound. Reforms are essential. They are urgently needed.” (Testimony of Former Congressman Lee Hamilton, Co-Chairman, Iraq Study Group)

 

The Iraq Study Group recommended that the Department of Justice and other agencies increase their training role to help Iraqis improve their police force and justice system. 

Rather than our military forces, “we believe that the principal responsibility for the training of police should be in the Department of Justice…[W]hile military police are very good in their field, the training of the civilian police force and the culture that needs to be developed . . . is really a job for civilian police executives and police supervisors. And so our recommendations include the fact that the Department of Justice, which is already experienced in this field under the International Criminal Investigation, Training and Assistance program, where they’ve done this in other countries, working on this subject, that they would be the principal agency of the federal government to pursue this particular task…We also recommend that the CIA and the FBI together work to establish in Iraq a more effective counterterrorism center, intelligence center and fusion center, just as we have done here in the United States, so that we can have intelligence-led responses to the terrorism attacks that are taking place there.” (Testimony of Former Attorney General Edwin Meese, Member, Iraq Study Group) 

The DNI Does Not Have Sufficient Authority To Fully Carry Out Its Statutory Responsibilities.

ROCKEFELLER: I’m convinced that separating the DNI from the day-to-day operation of the Central Intelligence Agency was the right step. For the first time ever, we now have somebody whose primary responsibility is organizing the different pieces of the intelligence community. I also think this arrangement benefits the CIA, since it now has the undivided attention of its director. 

But beyond the act of separating the two jobs, it is less clear whether the structure of the office, the DNI Office, is ideal to accomplish its mission -- hence, a work in progress. We did not pull the technical collection agencies out of the Defense Department, and we did not give the DNI direct authority over the main collection or analytic components of the community. We gave the DNI the authority to build the national intelligence budget, but we left the execution of the budget with the agencies. We gave the DNI tremendous responsibilities. The question is: Did we give the position enough authority for him to exercise those responsibilities?

 

Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Bond Emphasized that the Intelligence Community Must be More Forthcoming In Providing Congress With Intelligence Information.

ROCKFELLER:Congressional oversight is sometimes viewed only as a criticism. And at times, we do criticize, but it is our goal to make the intelligence community the best that it can be. And oversight should be cooperative, not confrontational. In order to accomplish this goal, we will have to work together to ensure that this committee has the access to the materials it needs to conduct oversight. 

It is no secret that neither Chairman Bond nor I have been happy, in the past, with decisions by some to restrict access to required information by our members and staff. Depriving our committee of the information it needs -- or over- restricting access to the information that we need -- not only weakens congressional oversight of secretive intelligence programs; it generates unnecessary suspicion; and, worst of all, undercuts the effectiveness of activities, generally. 

Vice Chairman Bond and I are committed to working together to overcome this problem. 

BOND: When the 2002 NIE Iraq WMD programs was provided, there were no evident problems with the document. However, at that time the committee did not examine the underlying intelligence that supported it. After the start of the war, we did examine the underlying intelligence and we quickly realized that the NIE’s characterization and interpretation of this intelligence was overstated and, in many cases, just plain wrong. 

I have said before that we wanted -- the Congress demanded that immediately in the worst way, and that’s, unfortunately, how we got it. We are not going to accept national security issue judgment without examining the intelligence underlying the judgments. And I believe this committee has an obligation to perform due diligence on such important documents. 

When we ask for documents, however, we’ve run into resistance. And the I.C. claims we should not be looking over its shoulder and checking its work. To me, that’s basically what oversight is all about. And I think the committee must look into the materials on which you based the judgment.

 

Mr. McConnell Testified That the Intelligence Community Needs To Be More Integrated and Collaborative.

MCCONNELL: To be effective, I believe we must have a more integrated and collaborative community; better information-sharing and communications processes to share; increased focus on the needs of our customers; more efficient acquisition, research and development and financial accounting; rapid and improved security processes; and deeper penetration of intelligence targets to produce the needed information for tactical, operational and strategic decision-makers. 

I believe the intelligence community needs to move beyond “need to know,” the approach of the Cold War; to a new approach that embraces the idea of, “responsibility to provide,” provide to our users from the president to the battlefield to state and local security officials.

 

Mr. McConnell Promised to Share With Congress All Information Necessary For Sufficient Oversight.

ROCKEFELLER: Do you believe that there are categories of information -- you may wish to think about that; simply tell me that -- categories of information that should be withheld from Congress for reasons such as I have stated, or notified only to the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committees in the House and the Senate? And, if so, what kinds of information? And, secondly, will you do everything in your power to ensure that all members and staff of this committee have access to the information they need to do their jobs? 

MCCONNELL: Well, sir, as I tried to capture in my written responses to your questions and my opening remarks today, as a general philosophy, now, and when I served on active duty before, I understand the responsibilities of Congress. And my philosophy is to provide the information you need for your oversight responsibilities. 

Now, there are some exceptions that have been captured in law, written by the Congress and approved by the president, that will make some exceptions. I would hope that those are very rare and few exceptions. And as you outlined, it would be mostly in an operational context when life and limb are at risk.

 

McConnell Pledged To Notify the Intelligence Committee If He Finds That the Administration Is “Cherrypicking or Exaggerating Intelligence.”

WYDEN: If you were the director of national intelligence, and you became aware that the Bush administration was cherrypicking or exaggerating intelligence to justify going to war, what would be your response? 

MCCONNELL: If I was aware that anyone was using information inappropriately, then I would make that known to whoever was abusing the information inappropriately.

 WYDEN: You would tell the president and this committee? 

MCCONNELL: I would tell all of those responsible for this process what the situation was. And in the role of this committee for oversight, you would be a part of that process, to be informed.

 

McConnell Testified That Private Contractors Should Not Be Used for Sensitive Intelligence Tasks Like Interrogation.

WYDEN: What jobs, Admiral, do you believe are too important or too sensitive to be performed by contractors? …. 

MCCONNELL: Actually, Senator, in anticipation of your question I looked to see if there were regulations inside government that would define that. And, as a matter of fact, there are. It’s an OMB circular. I don’t recall the number, but I could get it for you. But it talks about things like command or major decision-making or awarding contracts -- things that it describes as inherently governmental. But how I would think about it is decisions that are uniquely reserved for the government or any kind of command decision where you would involve using forces to do something like military activity or law enforcement, that sort of thing. 

WYDEN: So you wouldn’t be likely to want them to be interrogators, for example? 

MCCONNELL: I can’t imagine using our contractors for something like that,
 

McConnell Testified that the Administration Did Not Listen to His Concerns About How the Total Information Awareness Program Could Be Designed to Protect Americans’ Civil Liberties.

WYDEN: When we met in my office, I asked you about your role as a contractor for the John Poindexter program, Operation Total Information Awareness. We derailed it when we found out about the betting parlor idea. And I’d like your views regarding intelligence collection and how we balance the need to fight terrorism ferociously while still protecting the rights of our citizens. 

MCCONNELL: …When DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, wanted to engage in a program to move the state of the art of data mining from where it was to where it could be, they chose Admiral Poindexter to run that program. There was a competition when a number of contractors competed for that work. I was one of those competitors. And so another firm and my firm won the work. Now, interestingly -- although I’m not a technical expert; we had lots of technical experts; I was more of an operational adviser -- my advice during that evolution was to talk about how information could be used and to be very clear about how it could be applied under today’s laws, rules, values, Constitution, regulation. Unfortunately, my argument did not persuade and convince those who were making the decisions inside government for how they might describe it.

 

McConnell Acknowledged that the Intelligence Currently Provided to Our Troops In Iraq Is Inadequate.

SNOWE: One of the questions I wanted to ask you this afternoon was an article that appeared in the New York Times this last week and talked about a story about our soldiers in central Baghdad, on Haifa street. One of our soldiers was shot in an apartment, and they weren’t sure where the shot came from. And tragically, he died shortly thereafter. They were trying to figure out where the gunfire came from, and they thought perhaps it was shot by an Iraqi army soldier operating directly beneath him -- obviously, that hasn’t been ascertained --and that the Iraqi army unit wasn’t even supposed to be there at that point in time, but they didn’t have even communication links with their Iraqi counterparts because it was an Iraqi operation, as senior officers repeatedly emphasized, and the Americans could not order the Iraqis to get back in line. There was nothing they could do. 

Further on in the article there was a description of a young man telling our troops about a terrorist hiding in the slums behind the apartment buildings on Haifa Street’s eastern side. And the soldiers felt that it was impossible to know whether the boy had legitimate information or would lead them to an ambush. That summed up intelligence in Iraq, they said. There’s also the threat of being set up for an attack or an Iraqi’s own agenda. 

Now, I mean, I think that’s obviously disturbing. And given the fact that our troops are going to be embedded with Iraqi army units and engaged in going from street to street, neighborhood to neighborhood, apartment to apartment, as you see these repeated incidents and how would you characterize these types of incidents, as a principal adviser to the president? 

MCCONNELL: I would say they’re unacceptable, the way you described it.

Senator McCain believes that the Administration’s strategy to date in Iraq has failed.

MCCAIN: And while I do not in any way question your honor, your patriotism or your service to our country, I do question some of the decisions and judgments you have made over the past two and a half years as commander of Multi-National Forces in Iraq. During that time, things have gotten markedly and progressively worse, and the situation in Iraq can now best be described as dire and deteriorating. I regret that our window of opportunity to reverse momentum may be closing. The bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra last February sparked sectarian violence throughout Iraq; in Baghdad, in particular. 

Yet in the face of this dramatic change in the Iraqi security environment, our military strategy remained essentially unchanged. Instead of conducting a traditional counterinsurgency campaign, our troops focused on training and equipping Iraqis, hoping in vain that they could do the job. After repeated elections and political events demonstrated that the democratic process would not, on its own, bring down the level of violence, our troops did not begin focusing on protecting the population. 

Instead, coalition and Iraqi forces launched Operation Together Freedom (sic) in June 2006. This operation, aimed at securing Baghdad, failed. Yet the coalition launched Operation Together Forward II in August in a very similar fashion. The result, predictably, was a similar failure. The result of these and other missteps have been unprecedented levels of violence in Iraq and a pervasive lack of security that inhibits political and economic activity.

 

The Iraqis did not ask for, and the Iraqi Prime Minister did not want, more American troops.

LEVIN: Did they seek American forces in Baghdad? 

CASEY: There was not a long discussion about the plan that they presented. They basically passed it across the table. And it was actually quite a short discussion. 

LEVIN: And did the plan that they passed across the table include additional American troops? 

CASEY: It broadly identified the requirement for additional troops. I do not believe it specified Iraqi or coalition. Now, for Prime Minister Maliki, he would generally in rather not have additional coalition forces. I mean, that is his position. But he has listened to recommendations from his commander and from me about the need for these forces, and he is accepting those forces on an as-needed basis. 

LEVIN: So, basically, he felt that more security forces were needed inside Baghdad. 

LEVIN: He did not specify that any coalition forces would be needed as part of that. But it came from you and others that, if there are going to be additional forces inside of Baghdad, that coalition forces would be needed to provide some supplementary support. Is that fair? 

CASEY: That is fair, Senator. 

… 

LEVIN: This is what we need -- what America needs? 

CASEY: We collectively, the Iraqis and coalition forces: three Iraqi, two coalition. 

LEVIN: And then he accepted that? 

CASEY: He accepted that. 

LEVIN: But that was our proposal? 

CASEY: That was a joint proposal from the Iraqi ministers and us. 

LEVIN: So that you got together with the Iraqi ministers and then went to the prime minister and made a statement to him that,“We believe this mission requires coalition forces”? 

CASEY: That’s correct. 

LEVIN: And would you say the Iraqi military that were involved in that statement to the prime minister were persuaded of that? Did they initiate the idea or did we initiate the idea? 

CASEY: It came out of our planning, but they accepted and even endorsed the idea.

 

General Casey disagrees with the President that we have a failed strategy, and instead sees the escalation as an “enhancement” of current strategy.

MCCAIN: General Casey, I was interested in your opening statement which continues to be optimistic. In recent days, the secretary of defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Abizaid’s designated successor, Admiral Fallon, have all stated: We’re not winning and we had a failed strategy. Now, those are clear-cut statements for the record. Do you agree with that? 

CASEY: Do I agree that we have... 

MCCAIN: That we have a failed policy and we are not winning? 

CASEY: Senator, I do not agree that we have a failed policy. I believe the president’s new strategy will enhance the policy that we have.

 

Senator Warner prefers a reliance on Iraqi security forces, but General Casey acknowledges those forces do not enjoy the confidence of the Iraqi populaton.

WARNER: Why are we not putting greater emphasis on the utilization of Iraqi forces and less on the U.S. G.I. being put into that cauldron of terror generated by mistrust between the Iraqis and the Sunni that goes back 1,400 years? 

CASEY: I would say, Senator, that we are relying more on the Iraqis and forcing the Iraqis to take a more leading role in resolving the situation in Baghdad. I mean, they came up with the plan. They will lead the plan. And I agree with you, they are much better at understanding what’s going on on the streets of their own country than our soldiers are. One of the challenges we have, though, that I mentioned in my opening statement: It’s the confidence of all the population in the different elements of their security forces. And, largely, the Sunni population of Baghdad don’t trust the police… 

WARNER: My time is up. My hope and prayers are this plan succeeds, but that it succeeds by a greater and greater reliance on the Iraqi forces, and we will not have to use the full 20,500 Americans to implement this. Let the Iraqis. We’ve trained them for two and half years, invested a lot of time and money, and they should be the ones that carry the burden in Baghdad. And they’re willing to do that.

 

General Casey was unaware of a report by the Pentagon’s inspector general that found even current troops lack necessary armor and equipment.

CLINTON: Now, according to yesterday’s BusinessWeek summary of a new Department of Defense inspector general report, the inspector general is concerned that the U.S. military has failed to adequately equip soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially for nontraditional duties such as training Iraqi security forces and handling detainees. The equipment shortages were attributed to basic management failures among military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. Central Command lacked standard policies for requesting and tracking equipment requirements for units to perform their duties. 

CLINTON: General, have you seen this inspector general’s report? 

CASEY: I have not, Senator. 

CLINTON: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the committee request a copy of the inspector general’s report that was referred to in the BusinessWeek story, and that it be made available to the committee as soon as possible. 

… 

COLLINS: I understand why, in the early days of the war, this was a problem. And many of us worked very hard to increase funding for up-armored Humvees, for example. But I don’t understand why this is still a problem, according to DOD’s I.G. And I’m extremely concerned that, if it’s a problem for some troops serving now, that we’re not prepared to fully equip the troops that will soon be on their way. 

CASEY: I agree, Senator. I haven’t seen the report, but I am concerned about what you just read to me. And when I get back tomorrow, I will take a hard look at that and find out what the heck is going on. Because I have not heard, in my visits to the units, complaints about equipment shortages. In fact, quite the contrary, so it needs some looking into.

 

General Casey waivered on how many more brigades would be required in Iraq.

COLLINS: You’ve also very candidly testified that when you looked at the Baghdad security plan, you asked for two brigades, as that what you felt was adequate. You’ve also, however, said today that you support the president’s plan for five brigades. Doesn’t that violate your principle, based on your earlier assessment that only two brigades are needed, that you should not send one more American soldier to Iraq than is necessary? 

CASEY: Not really, because as I said, in my mind, the other three brigades should be called forward after an assessment has been made of the situation on the ground and whether or not there has been success in the mission in the Baghdad area. So, it’s one thing to say, “All five brigades are going into Baghdad.” It’s another to say, “We’ve got two, we have a decision point here for the third. We’ll assess to see what’s going on. If we need it, we’ll bring it in. If not, we won’t.” Same thing for the fourth, same thing for the fifth. So, I think the way the force flow is arranged gives the new commander lots of flexibility to either use the forces, based on his assessment of the need, or not use the forces. 

COLLINS: I understand your deferring to the new commander -- to General Petraeus’ view, but I need to ask you outright, if you were still in Iraq, would you be happy with just two brigades? 

CASEY: I would still want a reserve that I could call forward if things didn’t work out the way we had hoped, or to take advantage of an opportunity that presented itself. 

COLLINS: But you would start out with two brigades; that assessment hasn’t changed? 

CASEY: That’s where we are. That’s right.

 

General Casey believes the scope of de-Baathification and the failure to plan for occupation were both mistakes for which the U.S. continues to pay.

LEVIN: What about the de-Baathification program? Did it go too far? 

CASEY: It did. It still is. 

LEVIN: Sorry? 

CASEY: It still is. 

LEVIN: What about the failure to adequately plan for the occupation, looking at a worst-case scenario or a more complex occupation? Was that a mistake? 

CASEY: It certainly was. And it was compounded by the execution.

 

General Casey predicts an impact in roughly 60 days, but cannot say when the U.S. can begin to draw down forces in Iraq.

CASEY: Now, my sense is, as I have said publicly, we’ll start seeing an impact in 60 days or so, I think. One way or the other, we’ll start seeing an impact. And assuming things continue to progress positively, it will probably be the end of the summer before Baghdad is at a level of security that people are more inclined to feel comfortable with. What happens with respect to our forces after that? You know, it’s up to somebody else to figure that out. But I would look at the results on the ground and decide what I needed and what I didn’t need.

 

General Casey acknowledged the need to keep a close eye on the 20,000 armed private contractors operating in Iraq.

WEBB: The notion of accountability [for private contractors in Iraq] is deeply troubling. I’m not aware of any cases where misconduct -- and I’m not talking about the contracting situation, which we’re trying to get our arms around, but human misconduct -- shooting Iraqis out in the (inaudible) these sorts of things. I’m not aware of any incident where that sort of misconduct has been brought to proper justice. There may be one or two, but I’m not aware of it. And so my question really is: wouldn’t it be better for this country if those tasks, particularly the quasi-military gunfighting tasks, were being performed by active-duty military soldiers, in terms of costs and accountability? 

CASEY: In terms of costs, I’m not sure, Senator. We talked yesterday on this; you know, the notion of what’s the long-term cost to take a soldier, bring him in, train him to do this logistical task, take care of his family, when you compare that to the cost of the logistics contract. And I have not seen the figures on the cost/benefit on that. 

WEBB: I’d be interested in having those as you assume your new job. I think it’s something worthy of discussion on the (inaudible) 

CASEY: Right. I think the other part of this, though, it’s important that they are used -- that these contracts are used for logistics-type skills and not necessarily the combat skills I think you mentioned there earlier. We have --I want to say -- about 20,000 armed security contractors there that we work with and coordinate with. Those are the ones that we have to watch very carefully.

 

General Casey acknowledged challenges and setbacks in Iraq reconstruction.

MCCASKILL: Can you give us a ground view of how we could have made this large a mistake in terms of the monies that have been spent and ended up with the kind of failure we’d had in terms of meaningful reconstruction? 

CASEY: I have not seen the [SIGIR] report that you’re mentioning here, Senator. The reconstruction effort has, no question, been challenging. And we work very hard with the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, the ambassador and our engineers to ensure that the money that was allocated for the reconstruction of Iraq was appropriately spent. And that, as you suggest, has not always been the case. The other issue that you mentioned is a challenge, and that is the Iraqis’ ability to spend their own money. And it’s a combination of poor or nonexistent contracting procedures and fear of corruption. And the result has been that we have to do some fairly significant work with them, particularly in the security side, to get them -- to help them spend their money.

 

General Casey acknowledges that General Shinseki was probably right about the number of troops required to secure Iraq.

GRAHAM: There has never been a willingness on your part, during your time as commander in Iraq, to accept the idea that maybe Shinseki was right. Was Shinseki right? 

CASEY: My boss, General Abizaid, has said he agrees with that. And he was there on the ground...

 

General Casey says Americans can travel safely in only half of Iraq.

GRAHAM: What percentage of the country would it be impossible for an American to walk down the street without being afraid of getting shot at or killed? 

CASEY: Probably about half, actually, Senator.

 

General Casey would support Goldwater-Nichols-style legislation to improve interagency coordination.

DOLE: Let me ask one other question. The United States has enormous resources and expertise in a number of non-DOD departments and agencies that could be better utilized to help us achieve our national security objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It’s fair to say that today most, if not all national security objectives pursued by the United States are fundamentally interagency in nature. Do you believe it’s time for Congress to consider Goldwater-Nichols II type legislation to improve interagency coordination? 

CASEY: I think it’s something that ought to be looked at. And you’re exactly right. I’ve watched this now in Bosnia, I’ve watched it in Kosovo, and I’ve watched it in Iraq. And it really is an area where we keep relearning the same lessons again. And I think some type of program that would leverage the skills from across all the interagency in a sustained way I think would be very, very helpful to us all. Every time we’ve done it, we’ve said we’ll never do this again. And we forget the lessons, and then we do it again. And I think your notion is exactly right.

 

President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld did not follow the advice and requests from their commanders when informed that “clear, hold, build” was not working.

REED: And did you inform the secretary of defense and president that that aspect of the strategy was not working, at that time? 

CASEY: I told them that the holding on the focus areas was not working. In fact, now that you’re asking me about it, I recall specifically saying that we were having challenges with the reliability of the Iraqi security forces in the focus areas. So, yes, I did. 

… 

REED: What I find puzzling is that, if the strategy is clear, hold and build, and it’s been evident, not only yesterday, but for ever since we’ve been there, that the Iraqi government’s dysfunctional, our complementary agencies -- AID, State, Justice, Agriculture, Treasury -- have not provided the resources necessary, why didn’t this -- and you communicated to the president -- why didn’t this cause a reevaluation of our strategy by the president and secretary of defense? 

CASEY: I think what you’re seeing, in the president’s... 

REED: Well, we’re seeing it after an election. We’re not seeing it a year ago or two years ago when, in fact, on the ground, this was evident.

 

Others in the Department of Defense resisted a request from Generals Casey and Abizaid to increase involvement in Iraq by other elements of the U.S. Government.

CASEY: An example of, as you said, differing with civilian leadership, was on the provincial reconstruction teams. General Abizaid and I felt very strongly that these things were necessary if we were going to build the capacity, at the provincial level, so that the provinces could succeed. Others in the department disagreed with that and didn’t want to go forward with that. But General Abizaid and I continued to work through the department and with the ambassador and the Department of State. And we ultimately prevailed in getting the provincial reconstruction teams.

DPC